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George Rutherglent
Class actions under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure' are a common means of enforcing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which generally prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, national origin, sex, or religion.
Private plaintiffs in Title VII cases frequently seek relief on behalf
of all past, present, and future victims of the defendant's allegedly
discriminatory practices.' Indeed, boilerplate class action allega-
tions have become so common that they have prompted repeated
condemnation in judicial decisions.4 Plaintiffs, or more plausibly
their counsel, 5 have brought class actions in order to expand the
scope of relief. In an individual action, a judgment against the de-
fendant usually benefits only those who sue in their own names,6
but in a class action it benefits the entire class. Plaintiffs may seek
expanded relief to spread the cost of litigation7 or to achieve
broader goals of institutional reform. Their lawyers have the
added incentive in Title VII cases of increased awards of attorney's
fees if judgment is rendered for the class.9 Conversely, defendants
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1 FED. R. Cwv. P. 23.
' Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II
1978).
3 S. AGID, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LIGATION MANUAL 116-17 (1975); 4 H. NEWBERG ON
CLAss ACTIONS § 7985b, at 1316 (1977).
4 The Fourth Circuit has been particularly insistent. Belcher v. Bassett Furniture In-
dus., Inc., 588 F.2d 904, 906 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1978); Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298,
1312 (4th Cir. 1978); see Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 540 F.2d 699, 706-07 (4th Cir.
1976).
5 Developments in- the Law-Class Actions, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1318, 1578-80 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
I Some decisions, however, have held otherwise. E.g., Gray v. IBEW, 73 F.R.D. 638,
640-41 (D.D.C. 1977). See text and note at note 76 infra.
Developments, supra note 5, at 1353-54.
8 Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Problem," 92 HARv. L. REv. 664, 674-75 (1979).
' Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
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almost invariably oppose certification in order to limit their expo-
sure to monetary and injunctive relief.
Judges called upon to certify Title VII class actions have acted
with less predictability than litigants and their counsel. The range
of judicial attitudes is exemplified by two frequently repeated
maxims: "Racial discrimination is by definition class discrimina-
tion . . ,,;'o "But careful attention to the requirements of [rule
23] remains nonetheless indispensable."-" Commentators also have
reached varying conclusions, but one line of argument has been
particularly influential. It contends that, in general, rule 23 should
be molded to the substantive law under which particular claims are
brought.2 In Title VII cases, in particular, the rule should be in-
terpreted liberally in favor of certification because of the substan-
tive policy against discrimination. But advocates of this view
"o Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
" East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 408 (1977).
11 Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE
L.J. 718, 738-39 (1975); Developments, supra note 5, at 1353-72; see 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACrCE 1 23.46, at 23-396 to -416 (2d ed. 1978).
S See Meyers, Title VII Class Actions: Promises and Pitfalls, 8 Lov. CH. L.J. 767, 788
(1977); Peck, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the Ad-
ministrative Process, 51 WASH. L. REV. 831, 838-40 (1976); Smalls, Class Actions Under
Title VII: Some Current Procedural Problems, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 821, 874 (1976); Develop-
ments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1218-21 (1971); Comment, The Proper Scope of Representa-
tion in Title VII Class Actions: A Comment on East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 175, 197-99 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
The Proper Scope of Representation]; Note, Title VII and Postjudgment Class Actions, 47
IND. L.J. 350, 364-65 (1972); Note, Antidiscrimination Class Actions Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 Yale L.J. 868, 884-91
(1979).
Other commentators have followed the courts in emphasizing that the requirements of
rule 23 still must be satisfied. See Miller, Class Actions and Employment Discrimination
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 Miss. L.J. 275, 280-85 (1972); Note, The
Class Action Device in Title VII Suits, 28 S.C.L. REV. 639, 685-86 (1977); Comment, Class
Actions and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Proper Class Representative and
the Class Remedy, 47 TuL. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (1973); Comment, The Class Action and
Title VII-An Overview, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 325, 338 (1976); see 3B J. MOORE, supra note
12, 1 23.02 [2.-7], at 23-52 to -53; 7 C, WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1771, at 662-66 (1972).
Defense counsel understandably have opposed liberal certification of Title VII class ac-
tions. Ashe, The Fair Employment Class Action: Taking a Closer Look, 3 LITIGATION 29, 29-
31 (1977); Connolly & Connolly, Qualifying Title VII Class Action Discrimination Suits: A
Defendant's Perspective, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 181, 212-13 (1977); Gardner, The Development
of the Meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 ALA. L. REV. 451, 517-19
(1971); Shawe, Processing the Explosion in Title VII Class Action Suits: Achieving In-
creased Compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 19 WM. & MARY L. REV.
469, 517-18 (1978).
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have failed to clarify the relationship between the substantive pol-
icy against discrimination and the requirements of rule 23. Which
requirements of the rule are affected by the substantive policy
against discrimination? Why are they made weaker instead of
stronger? What basis is there in the statute or its legislative his-
tory for this modification of class action practice?
This article examines the development of the law of Title VII
class actions in detail. I argue that the presumption in favor of
certification, as it is usually formulated, is unsupported by rule 23
or Title VII. It has insufficient basis in congressional intent as re-
vealed in Title VII and its legislative history, or in substantive pol-
icy as declared in subsequent judicial decisions. It may further the
goal of eliminating discrimination, but only in a haphazard way
and by ignoring some of the few accepted principles of class action
practice. I argue that the presumption in favor of certification
should be replaced by a limited precertification inquiry into the
merits of the individual and class claims asserted by the named
plaintiff. To the extent that substantive policies affect Title VII
class actions, they are best taken into account by such an inquiry.
An examination of the merits would also enable the district court
to make a better determination whether the requirements of rule
23 have been met. This proposal is not a radical departure from
existing practice. The federal courts often take account of the mer-
its in one way or another before granting or denying certification,
despite decisions seemingly disapproving this procedure, princi-
pally the Supreme Court's opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin.14 That decision, I argue, is concerned with a distinguishable
issue, namely, whether the cost of notice may be shifted to the de-
fendant after a preliminary finding of merit. The article concludes
with the application of this proposal to some leading Title VII
class action decisions.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS
A. Enactment of Title VII
Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15
The Act was bitterly opposed, most effectively by a group of
Southern senators who engaged in a filibuster to prevent the legis-
.4 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
15 Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
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lation from coming to a vote."' The legislative maneuvers necessary
to end debate in the Senate left their mark upon the Act.17 Both
procedural and substantive compromises were necessary to assure
passage of Title VII. The procedural compromises were crucial to
the development of class actions as a means of enforcing the stat-
ute.18 They resulted in amendment of Title VII to deny adminis-
trative proceedings and public actions a central role in enforcing
the statute, leaving private suits and class actions to fill the void.
As originally enacted, Title VII provided for private actions
only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. Proceedings
could be initiated either by "a person claiming to be aggrieved" or
by a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").V 9 After a charge was filed with the Commission, it con-
ducted an investigation. If it found reasonable cause supporting
the charge, it attempted to eliminate the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice by conciliation.20 If conciliation did not result in a
settlement satisfactory to all parties, the Commission was required
to notify the charging party of his right to sue, or if a charge was
filed by a member of the Commission, to notify "any person whom
the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice."21 Suit could be brought in federal district court,
22
14 See generally Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431,
443-46 (1966).
17 Id. at 443-46, 457.
18 The substantive compromises were an explicit refusal to require quotas and special
protection for seniority, merit systems, and professionally developed ability tests. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(h), (j), 78 Stat. 256 (1964) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), (j) (1976)). They are only marginally relevant to the availability of class
actions, although the compromises on quotas and testing have some bearing on the theory of
disproportionate adverse impact, which in turn is relevant to the availability of class actions.
See text and notes at notes 141-144 infra.
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (1964) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)).
to Id. See also id. §§ 709, 710, 78 Stat. 262-64 (current versions at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8-
2000e-9 (1976)). Exhaustion of available state or local remedies also was required. Id.
§ 706(a), (b), (e), 78 Stat. 259-60 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (d) (1976)).
:' Id. § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)).
2 Id. § 706(0, 78 Stat. 260-61 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976)).
Federal jurisdiction has sometimes been held to be exclusive, despite the absence of express
statutory language to that effect. The issue, however, has arisen infrequently because few
Title VII cases have been filed in state court. For surveys of the cases and the arguments,
see Peterson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1322 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (con-
current jurisdiction); Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1393, 1394-96
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (exclusive jurisdiction); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHS-
LER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 418-19 (2d ed.
1974).
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and upon finding an intentional violation of Title VII, the court
could "enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful em-
ployment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be ap-
propriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay. '23 The court could also award a reasona-
ble attorney's fee to the prevailing party. Before judgment, it
could appoint an attorney for the plaintiff and allow the com-
mencement of the action without payment of "fees, costs, or
security."25
Public actions could be commenced by the Attorney General
independently of administrative proceedings, or upon referral from
the EEOC, but only if the Attorney General found reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant was engaged in a "pattern or
practice" of employment discrimination. 26 Jurisdiction over "pat-
tern or practice" suits was granted to the federal district courts,
and such actions were to be assigned for hearing "at the earliest
practicable date" and "to be in every way expedited. 2 7 The Attor-
ney General could also seek permissive intervention in private ac-
tions upon his certification "that the case is of general public
importance. '2 8
This allocation of enforcement powers among administrative
proceedings, public actions, and private suits was the result of a
series of compromises that steadily diluted the power of the EEOC
to prosecute and decide cases, and steadily strengthened the power
of private individuals to sue and of federal judges to adjudicate.
The first version of the EEOC's enforcement authority considered
in the House was approved by a subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary. It followed the model of the National Labor Re-
lations Board.2 9 The Commission was divided into an adjudicative
board and a prosecutorial administrator. ° A charge could be filed
23 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261 (1964) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976)). This broad authorization of equitable relief was
qualified by provisions requiring mitigation of back pay liability and precluding affirmative
relief if the respondent had acted for a nondiscriminatory reason. Id.
24 Id. § 706(k), 78 Stat. 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976)).
25 Id. § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)).
2 Id. § 707(a), 78 Stat. 261-62 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1976)).
2- Id. § 707(b), 78 Stat. 262 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b) (1976)).
28 Id. § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)).
29 See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act §§ 3-6, 9-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156, 159-
161 (1976).
" H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8, 9 (1963), reprinted in Hearings on Miscellane-
ous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the United
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with the Commission "by or on behalf of any person claiming to be
aggrieved" or by the administrator. 1 The board determined
whether the statute had been violated, and had the power to issue
cease-and-desist orders and to grant affirmative relief.3 2 The ad-
ministrator could petition the courts of appeals to enforce the
board's orders and any person aggrieved by an order could petition
for review in the courts of appeals.33 The charging party possessed
no right to a de novo judicial determination of his claim following
a board decision, although he possessed a residual right to sue if
proceedings before the board were not commenced within a rea-
sonable time.3 "
The full Committee on the Judiciary, however, substituted
provisions that deprived the Commission of enforcement powers
but authorized it to sue in federal court upon a finding of reason-
able cause.3 5 If the Commission did not sue within 90 days of its
finding of reasonable cause, the "person claiming to be aggrieved"
could sue provided one member of the Commission agreed.38 The
Committee's shift toward judicial enforcement apparently was
prompted by the belief that the EEOC would enforce the statute
too harshly and that the federal courts would provide a fairer fo-
rum for those charged with discrimination. 7 The bill passed the
States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. 3, at 2331-32. The provisions of this bill were substituted for the employment discrimi-
nation provisions in the bill before the subcommittee, H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963), and approved by the subcommittee in that form. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 17, 41, 57, 87, 117 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391,
2392-93, 2411, 2426, 2455, 2483; see Vass, supra note 16, at 435 (1966).
1, H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b) (1963).
" Id. § 10(i).
Id. § 11(a), (b).
Id. §§ 10(c), 11(d).
35 H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(b) (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2391, 2404.
36 Id. § 707(c), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2405. The right
to sue was further circumscribed by the Commission's duty to seek agreements with state or
local agencies having "effective power to eliminate and prohibit discrimination in employ-
ment in cases covered by this title." Id. § 708(b), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2391, 2405-06. In cases covered by such agreements, neither the Commission nor a
private party possessed the power to sue. Id.
', The report of the Committee majority was noncommital. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 26, 28-30 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2391, 2401, 2404-06. Supporters of the Committee bill took the view either that the change
would produce greater efficiency and fairness, id. pt. 2, at 29, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 2515-16, or that it would delay enforcement proceedings but not unac-
ceptably, id. at 41, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2411. Opponents
either were indifferent to the change or considered it to be an insignificant moderation of
1980]
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House in this form without significant debate on the allocation of
enforcement powers."8
In the Senate, the bill was amended, weakening the enforce-
ment powers of the EEOC even further, and it became law in this
form.39 The EEOC's power to sue was transferred to the Attorney
General. Additionally, his power was restricted to "pattern or prac-
tice" cases and permissive intervention in private actions "of gen-
eral public importance. ' 40 In addition to diluting public enforce-
ment power, the Senate increased the attractiveness of private
actions by adding provisions for appointment of an attorney for
the plaintiff, waiver of fees, costs, and security, and an award of
attorney's fees in the discretion of the district court.41 The Senate
diminished the scope of private remedies only by deleting the pro-
vision in the House bill allowing private persons to file charges "on
behalf of" victims of discrimination. 2
The removal of enforcement authority from the EEOC and the
restrictions upon the Attorney General's power to sue inevitably
left enforcement of the statute largely in the hands of private
plaintiffs and federal judges. The Attorney General exercised his
power to sue, as the statute seemed to command, only in a small
number of relatively important cases.43 By 1972, it had become
clear that, due to inadequate funding, the Department of Justice
the subcommittee's bill. Id. pt. 1, at 58, 75-76, 87, 118, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2391, 2427, 2444, 2455, 2484. See Vaas, supra note 16, at 36-37.
Vass, supra note 16, at 437-43. The debate in the House touched on the allocation of
enforcement powers only indirectly, through expressions of concern that the EEOC's powers
were too broad. See 110 CONG. REC. 1518, 1521 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 2563-
67 (remarks of Rep. Celler, Rep. O'Hara, Rep. McCulloch, Rep. Goodell, Rep. Lindsay, Rep.
Cramer, Rep. Roosevelt, Rep. Pepper, Rep. Griffin & Rep. Poff); id. at 2715 (remarks of
Rep. Goodell).
" Vass, supra note 16, at 446.
40 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 706(e), 707(a), 78 Stat. 260, 261
(1964) (current versions at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 200e-6(a) (1976)).
41 Id. § 706(e), (k), 78 Stat. 260, 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), (k) (1976)).
See text at note 89 infra.
41 Id. § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). Senator
Dirksen sought this change in order to distinguish between "two types of court action, those
brought by an individual to seek redress of a civil wrong or those brought by the Attorney
General to correct a public wrong." 110 CONG. REc. 8193 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen);
see id. at 7217 (remarks of Sen. Clark in response to questions by Sen. Dirksen); Vaas,
supra note 16, at 446-47, 452-53.
"' U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 80-81 (1972). The Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department filed 26
cases concerned with employment in fiscal year 1968, 20 in fiscal year 1969, 10 in fiscal year
1970, 18 in fiscal year 1971, and 34 in fiscal year 1972. Id. at 86.
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was unable to pursue a significant percentage of even these cases. 4 4
It also had become clear that the EEOC could not process the in-
creasing number of charges that it received quickly enough to fore-
stall private suits. The volume of charges greatly exceeded the ex-
pectations of the Commission and Congress, and as the backlog of
pending charges increased, 5 it became apparent that the statutory
time limits for processing charges could not be met; yet failure to
meet those time limits was sufficient grounds for private litiga-
tion.4 Both public enforcement actions and public administrative
proceedings were eclipsed by private actions as the most effective
means of enforcing the statute.
The prominent role of private actions was anticipated in part
in the statutory language,'7 but the importance of class actions was
not anticipated at all. Neither the statute nor its legislative history
endorsed class actions as a favored means of private litigation.
Class actions escaped congressional notice in part because they did
not attain prominence until the 1966 revision of rule 23,4' but more
significantly, because Congress expressly dealt with the issue of
classwide litigation by granting authority to the Attorney General
44 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2149; 118 CONG. REc. 4080-82 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Javits &
Sen. Williams).
45 118 CONG. REC. 4080 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams). The backlog of charges
pending with the Commission for investigation or conciliation steadily increased, both in
absolute terms and relative to the number of such charges finally disposed of each year. At
the end of fiscal year 1969, 7,117 charges were pending for investigation or conciliation and
6,781 had been finally disposed of after investigation or conciliation; at the end of fiscal year
1970, the corresponding figures were 12,355 and 5,237; and at the end of fiscal year 1971,
they were 22,026 and 6,977. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, FOURTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 34 (1970); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, FIFTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT 64-65 (1971); U.S. EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT
55 (1972) (Calculations from figures for charges referred for investigation or conciliation.
Charges finally disposed of consist of completed investigations not referred for conciliation
plus completed conciliations.). See also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 369
n.24 (1977) (giving higher figures).
46 The statute originally provided that if the Commission was unable to obtain volun-
tary compliance after considering a charge for 30 days, or upon extension 60 days, it "shall
so notify the person aggrieved." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78
Stat. 260 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)).
4" See the provisions for award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, id. § 706(k), 78
Stat. 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976)), for appointment of an attorney for the
charging party and waiver of fees, costs, and security, id. § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)), and for broad judicial discretion to grant affirm-
ative relief, id. § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976)).
4" See text and notes at notes 53-100 infra.
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to bring pattern-or-practice actions."9 Congress also denied author-
ity to private persons to file administrative charges on behalf of
others, suggesting that, far from endorsing class actions, it in-
tended at that time to preclude private authority to litigate on be-
half of others.50
Ironically, the fear that the EEOC would enforce the statute
too vigorously led Congress to grant the power to interpret and
apply the statute to the federal courts, which enforced it as vigor-
ously as any administrative agency could, but with the greater
prestige of the federal judiciary. The subsequently revised rule 23
was one device that enabled them to do so.
B. Revision of Rule 23
The 1966 revision of rule 23 has raised persistent questions
about the meaning and validity of the rule. Doubts about meaning
have arisen from the rule's vague and overlapping requirements
and the great degree of discretion it vests in the district judge.
Doubts about validity have arisen from the dramatic increase in
private enforcement of federal law that followed revision of the
rule. This effect on private actions has raised doubts whether the
rule satisfies the requirement of the Rules Enabling Act 51 that the
rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. ' '8 2
I argue in this and subsequent sections that these doubts can be
partially resolved by closer examination of the effect of statutory
law, and in particular Title VII, on the application of rule 23.
1. The Structure of Rule 23. In the 1966 revision of rule 23,
the Advisory Committee sought to replace the overly conceptual
structure and terminology of the original rule 23 with provisions
that defined more clearly the requirements and consequences of
certification of a class action.53 The revisers dispensed with the
original rule's division of class actions into "true," "hybrid," and
41 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 261-62 (1964) (current
version at 42 .U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976)).
1o Id. § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). See text
and note at note 42 supra. The "on behalf of" language, however, was restored by the 1972
amendments to Title VII. See text and notes at notes 175-176 infra.
"' 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2076 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
52 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
11 FED. R. Civ. P., Adv. Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 98-99 (1966); Kaplan, Continuing
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(pt. 1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 380-84 (1967).
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"spurious, 5 4 and substituted subdivisions (a) and (b) of the pres-
ent rule. These permit certification of a class action only if all of
the requirements of subdivision (a) are met: numerosity, common-
ality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.5 In addition, one
of the requirements of subdivision (b) must be met: under subdivi-
sion (b)(1), there must be a risk that individual actions would im-
pose incompatible standards of conduct on the party opposing the
class or would result in practical harm to the interests of class
members; under subdivision (b)(2), classwide injunctive or declara-
tory relief must be appropriate; under subdivision (b)(3), the legal
or factual issues common to the class must predominate, and a
class action must be superior to other means of adjudication."
These requirements were intended to implement two distinct and
sometimes conflicting policies: to provide an efficient means for
mass litigation, and, at the same time, to afford adequate protec-
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1938), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 94-95 (1966).
"I Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that join-
der of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
"Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party oppos-
ing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their inter-
ests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
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tion to absent class members and to the party opposing the class.57
Although the revisers sought to provide clear guidance to dis-
trict judges in achieving this goal, 58 the requirements of the rule
are framed in broad and uncertain terms.59 Furthermore, they
overlap to such an extent that their meaning is often obscured. For
instance, there have been continuing doubts whether the require-
ment of typicality in subdivision (a)(3) adds anything to the re-
quirement of commonality in subdivision (a)(2) or to the require-
ment of adequacy of representation in subdivision (a)(4). 60
Similarly, the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) that common
questions of law or fact predominate and that a class action be a
superior device for fair and efficient adjudication61 appear only to
restate the general objectives that underlie the entire rule and that
find expression in other provisions.62 The effect of such vague,
overlapping terms has been to confer upon the district judge broad
power to decide whether a case should proceed as a class action.
This tendency has been exaggerated by the holdings of some courts
of appeals that the decision whether to certify a class action is re-
57 See Kaplan, supra note 53, at 387-92; Developments, supra note 5, at 1321-23.
58 Kaplan, supra note 53, at 386.
" Representative reactions to rule 23 are that it "tends to ask more questions than it
answers," Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39,
39 (1967), that it is "complicated" or "extremely complicated," 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MiLLER,
supra note 13, § 1753, at 540 & n.38, and that "[t]he result of the rulemakers' efforts is a
hodgepodge of pragmatic and occasionally conflicting objectives." Developments, supra note
5, at 1323.
Others have expressed the view that only continued experience with the rule can give
content to its requirements. Miller, supra note 8, at 669-82. See Frankel, supra, at 52 (full
evaluation of rule 23 may require a generation of experience); Weinstein, Some Reflections
on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 305-06 (1973) (supporting changes in
class action practice through modifications of Manual for Complex Litigation). The original
version of rule 23 evoked a similar reaction. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 199-200
(1950).
80 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, I1 23.06-2, at 23-185 to -198 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1979-
80); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1764, at 611-12 (1972 & Supp. 1978); Devel-
opments, supra note 5, at 1458-71, 1625.
81 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See note 56 supra.
62 See 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, 23.45[2], at 23-324, 23-327 to -328 (subdivision
(b)(3) goes beyond requirements of subdivision (a) but requirement of predominance im-
plicit in subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2)); id. 23.45[3], at 23-354 to -355 (absence of superior-
ity may indicate inadequate fulfillment of requirements of subdivision (a)); 7A C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1780, at 64 (factors listed in subdivision (b)(3) overlap with
each other and with requirements of subdivision (a)); Developments, supra note 5, at 1626-
27 (requirement of predominance should apply to all class actions and requirement of supe-
riority retained only as an" aspect of predominance). But see 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 13, § 1778, at 50-52 (requirement of predominance unclear, but more than com-
monality requirement of subdivision (a)(2)).
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viewable only for abuse of discretion. 3
The rule further increases the power of the district judge by
explicitly granting him discretion to protect class members from
abuse, particularly by the named plaintiff and his attorney who
might advance their own interests at the expense of the class.6 4
Subdivision (d) grants the district judge plenary authority over the
conduct of class actions, including the power to order notice to
members of the class and to impose conditions on the class repre-
sentatives." Subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(4) allow the district judge
to vary the extent of the class and to create subclasses if appropri-
ate."6 Finally, subdivision (e) requires "the approval of the court"
for all settlements, as well as notice to "all members of the class in
such manner as the court directs. '67 The revisers' strategy is ap-
parent, and perhaps inevitable. Because absent class members
could not protect themselves, while the named plaintiff and the
class attorney might favor their own interests over those of the
class, great discretion had to be granted to" the district judge. No
one else present in court could be trusted to protect the class.6 8
As with most disputes over the revision of rule 23, concern
over the divergent interests of the class and its representatives fo-
cused on class actions for damages under subdivision (b)(3). The
perceived danger was that a recovery on behalf of innumerable
holders of small claims could not be distributed efficiently and
would end up in the hands of the class attorney.6 To meet this
danger, the revisers surrounded (b)(3) class actions with more
elaborate procedural safeguards than (b)(1) or (b)(2) class actions.
11 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, 1 23.50, at 23-436 to -437; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 13, § 1785, at 134-35, 135 n.69 (1972 & Supp. 1978).
" Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compen4.ation, Deterrence and Conflict of Interest,
4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 56-61 (1975).
65 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d). See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION § 1.43, at 41-42 (4th ed. 1977) ("almost plenary authority"); 3B J. MOORE, supra note
12, 23.70, at 23-480; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1791, at 193-94.
64 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), (4). See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 65, § 1.42, at
31-33; 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, T 23.65, at 23-473 to -476; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 13, § 1790, at 189-92 (1972 & Supp. 1978).
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). For elaboration of these requirements, see FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, supra note 65, § 1.46, at 53-65; 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, q 23.80, at 23-503 to
-528; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1797, at 226-39 (1972 & Supp. 1978).
48 Even so, the district judge may have interests in managing the docket that diverge
from the interests of absent class members. See Dam, supra note 64, at 49-54; Develop-
ments, supra note 5, at 1500.
11 H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 118-20 (1973); Dam, Class Ac-
tion Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 97, 97, 121-26; Kaplan, supra note 53, at
394-400. See note 85 infra.
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Individual notice must be sent to all class members "who can be
identified through reasonable effort, '70 and the judgment binds
only those members of the class who decide not to opt out after
receiving notice. 1 Moreover, the general requirement that the dis-
trict court rule upon certification "[a]s soon as practicable after
the commencement of an action''72 is particularly important in
class actions for damages under subdivision (b)(3). The revisers in-
tended to eliminate the practice, which had grown up in class ac-
tions for damages under the original rule, of "one-way interven-
tion" by members of the class after judgment in their favor.73 A
necessary corollary is that certification be granted before determi-
nation of the merits, so that class members cannot evade an ad-
verse judgment by subsequently seeking denial of certification or
opting out.
The continuing controversy surrounding subdivision (b)(3) has
obscured the breadth of subdivision (b)(2). A professional consen-
sus has developed that the situations identified by subdivision
(b)(2) "'naturally' or 'necessarily' called for unitary adjudica-
tion. 7 4 The desirability of classwide injunctive or declaratory re-
lief when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class"7 5 has been taken for
granted to such an extent that the need for invoking the special
procedure of rule 23 has been called into question. Indeed, a line of
decisions, commencing under the original version of rule 23, has
held that certification of a class action is unnecessary when the
plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief that extends to an
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). This requirement was interpreted strictly in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
71 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), (3); see FED. R. Civ. P., Adv. Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 104-
106 (1966). The revisers' attitude toward preclusion is puzzling. One objective of the revision
was to clarify the preclusive effect of class actions, and subdivisions (c)(2) and (c)(3) appear
to resolve this issue. See id. at 98-99. But the revisers intended the language of subdivisions
(c)(2) and (c)(3) to be only suggestive, because preclusion might be a matter of substantive
law and so beyond the grant of rule making power, and because the preclusive effect of a
judgment is better decided by the court before whom the claim of preclusion is made. Id. at
104; Kaplan, supra note 53, at 378 & nn.79-80, 393. See 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12,
1 23.60, at 23-469 to -470; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1789, at 176-78;
Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REV.
589, 592-93 (1974).
72 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1).
71 See FED. R. Civ. P,, Adv. Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 99, 105-06 (1966).
7' Kaplan, supra note 53, at 386.
71 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). See note 56 supra.
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entire class.7e The availability of classwide relief, even in the ab-
sence of certification, led the revisers to minimize the procedural
safeguards surrounding class actions under subdivision (b)(2). No-
tice to class members was not required, and they had no right to
opt out of the litigation to avoid being bound by the judgment.7 7
This difference between the procedural safeguards required in
(b)(2) and (b)(3) class actions has become particularly important
in Title VII litigation. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and
its reporter, Professor Kaplan, singled out civil rights cases as an
example of litigation appropriate for certification under subdivi-
sion (b)(2).78 This suggestion, and the further suggestion that certi-
fication under subdivision (b)(2) should be preferred to certifica-
tion under subdivision (b)(3),79 were taken up by courts confronted
with cases that satisfied the requirements of both subdivisions
(b)(2) and (b)(3).80 The effect of the Advisory Committee's com-
ment was to permit liberal certification of class actions in Title VII
cases without the safeguards of subdivision (b)(3).
These consequences were largely unwarranted. The Advisory
Committee did not purport to select certain substantive claims for
special treatment, and even if, it had, such an attempt would have
aggravated doubts about the validity of the rule under the Rules
Enabling Act.81 The Committee confined itself to the observation
71 0. Fiss, INJUNcTIONs 484-88 (1972); 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, 23.40[3], at 23-292
to -297 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1979); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1785, at
67-70 (Supp. 1978). As Professor Chafee remarked of an earlier stage in the evolution of
class actions: "The very identity of interests which made it easy to bring everybody in, also
made it somewhat superfluous to do so." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 59, at 201.
"' They were protected only by the discretion of the district judge to issue notice or to
take other steps under subdivision (d), FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
78 FED. R. Civ. P., Adv. Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 102 (1966); Kaplan, supra note 53, at
389.
" Kaplan, supra note 53, at 390 n.130.
80 E.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1973). See 3B J.
MOORE, supra note 12, 23.31, at 23-261 to -264; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13,
§ 1775, at 30-31 (1972 & Supp. 1978). Normally, class actions under subdivision (b)(2) are
distinguished from those under (b)(3) by the type of relief sought. Predominantly injunctive
or declaratory relief calls for certification under subdivision (b)(2). If monetary relief is
sought, certification should be under subdivision (b)(3). 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12,
% 23.40[4] (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1979); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1775, at
21-24 (1972 & Supp. 1978). This distinction is obscured, however, when monetary relief is
requested along with injunctive relief, as it is in most Title VII class actions, see, e.g., Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-23 (1975).
"1 For example, if the attempt had been motivated by reasons apart from procedure,
such as the particular evil of discrimination or the particular need to grant relief to civil
rights plaintiffs, it would have been of questionable validity. See note 86 infra.
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that civil rights actions were "illustrative" of cases suitable for cer-
tification under subdivision (b)(2)s2 and it confined this observa-
tion to a nonbinding note.
2. The Validity of Rule 23. The debate over whether rule 23
affects substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act8
has also focused on class actions under subdivision (b)(3).84 Sub-
division (b)(3), it was argued, transformed the small claims of indi-
vidual class members, which could not support the cost of ifidepen-
dent lawsuits, into an aggregate of claims on behalf of the class
whose value could extend into the millions of dollars.8" The small
value of such claims also made it unlikely that any monetary relief
would actually reach members of the class, so that no one other
than the class attorney would benefit from the class action. Subdi-
vision (b)(3) thus allowed the enforcement of claims that were not
otherwise worth the cost of suit, putting defendants at a disadvan-
tage not contemplated by the substantive law creating the cause of
action, and shifting the control and benefit of the claim away from
the person granted the claim by the substantive law.
These arguments should not be overstated, however. Rule 23
cannot be faulted simply because it alters the balance of tactical
advantage among the parties. The very purpose of procedural rules
is to provide a mechanism for enforcing substantive rights. Proce-
dural rules therefore necessarily affect the enforcement of substan-
tive law, and consequently the outcome of litigation and the bal-
ance of tactical advantage among the parties. It follows that rule
23 does not violate the Rules Enabling Act by allowing plaintiffs to
pursue small claims more effectively, or by putting defendants at a
82 The full statement of the Advisory Committee, omitting citations, is:
Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged
with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapa-
ble of specific enumeration. . . . Subdivision (b)(2) is not limited to civil-rights cases.
FED. R. Civ. P. Adv. Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 102 (1966). Accord, Kaplan, supra note 53, at
389 ("Next comes new subdivision (b)(2), building on experience mainly, but not exclu-
sively, in the civil rights field").
83 See text at note 52 supra.
Miller, supra note 8, at 670.
Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and
the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842, 855-61 (1974); Simon, Class
Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 386 (1972); see Handler,
The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1971) (rule 23 should be limited
to its intended purposes of economizing judicial resources and preventing inconsistent re-
sults); Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905,
930 n.168 (1976) (same).
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tactical disadvantage. These consequences are the inevitable ef-
fects of increased procedural efficiency, and do not affect substan-
tive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling.Act.86
The emphasis on eliminating all effects on substantive rights
is also misleading in another respect. It neglects the possibility
that procedural, as well as substantive, provisions of federal statu-
tory law override the provisions of rule 23.87 The question is not
whether rule 23 affects the enforcement of substantive rights, but
whether it does so contrary to the provisions, whether substantive
or procedural, of the statute that created those rights.
88 This conclusion follows easily from the definition of "procedure" offered in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965): "matters which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." It also
follows from the more exacting definition in Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 693, 724-27 (1974): a "procedural rule" is "one designed to make the process of
litigation a fair and efficient means for the resolution of diiputes," id. at 724 (footnote omit-
ted), and a "substantive right" is "a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons,
for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of litigation,"
id. at 725 (footnote omitted).
By "procedural efficiency," I mean maximizing the accuracy and minimizing the cost
with which substantive policies are implemented in settlement and adjudication. Rules jus-
tified on this basis are procedural under either of the above definitions of "procedure." Pro-
cedural efficiency favors plaintiffs with small claims just as much as procedural inefficiency
favors defendants opposing such claims. Procedural efficiency favors plaintiffs by decreasing
the cost of meeting the burdens of production and persuasion which are usually placed upon
them. This, in turn, decreases the value that the claims must possess in order to be worth
pursuing. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 59, at 300 ("Class actions favor plaintiffs. There is no
doubt about it."). In cases in which the claim already exceeds the threshold value, increased
efficiency might also favor the defendant. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 408-10, 428-41 (1973).
97 A passage in the Rules Enabling Act might suggest that the rule overrides inconsis-
tent statutes: "Nothing in this title [28 U.S.C.], anything therein to the contrary notwith-
standing, shall in any way limit, supersede or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by
the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). But this passage was added to the Act only to
avoid implicit repeal of the civil and admiralty rules by provisions in the 1948 revision of
the Judicial Code. S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1948).
Congress has exercised its power to modify rule 23 in several statutes. E.g., Truth in
Lending Act Amendments of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976) (limitation upon total liability
in class actions); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976) (same); Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B) (Supp. I 1977) (same); Magnuson-
Moss Consumer Product Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (1976) (class action allowed only
if defendant granted reasonable opportunity to cure violation alleged); Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified in
scattered sections of 19, 28 U.S.C.) (authorizing state attorney general to sue on behalf of
state residents, displacing private class actions); Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1976) (consent to representation required from class members in actions under
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (1976), and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1) (1976)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1976) (same).
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3. The Significance of Statutory Law. An examination of Ti-
tie VII reveals that the general arguments against the validity of
rule 23, as reflected in the debate over subdivision (b)(3), are not
readily applicable to Title VII class actions. Title VII class actions
do not usually involve small claims that hardly justify the expense
of administering relief. Individual claims for hiring, reinstatement,
promotion, or back pay are often worth enough to be indepen-
dently prosecuted, s particularly since the statute requires the
award of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in most cases.8, The
award of attorney's fees also provides some assurance that the
class attorney will not be compensated instead of the class by an
award of damages.
On the other hand, claims for injunctions to restructure hiring
and promotion policies, working conditions, and seniority systems
can often be brought only as class actions. As to such claims, certi-
fication under subdivision (b)(1) is appropriate, because individual
actions either would establish inconsistent standards of conduct
for the employer or would inevitably affect the interests of an en-
tire class of employees or applicants for employment.90 The only
fair remedy in such'cases is one applied on a classwide basis. Class
members excluded from the scope of an injunction would not re-
main at the prelitigation status quo but would be made worse off
by the advantages granted to others. If the only fair means of liti-
gation is on a classwide basis, then certification should be granted
under subdivision (b)(1) on grounds of necessityY1 Not all Title
33 Somewhat analogous recoveries of back pay under the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), have averaged over $1,500 for the last three fiscal years. U.S.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 214 (1977) (computations
from first column of Table 4); U.S. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FORTY-SECOND AN-
NUAL REPORT 227, 275 (1978); U.S. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FORTY-THIRD AN-
NUAL REPORT 247 (1979). Other forms of relief are also available under Title VII, of course.
"' Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); see Christiansburg
,Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978).
90 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). See Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 329, 389-90 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Rendon v. Western Elec. Co., 21 Fair
EmpI. Prac. Cas. 400, 402 (W.D. Tex. 1978); Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n,
15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6241, 6242 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D.
523, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 394 F. Supp. 434 (N.D.
Ala. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978); Comment, The Proper Scope of Representation, supra note 13, at 194-97. Contra,
Clark v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 697, 700 (W.D. La. 1976).
' The theory and terminology of subdivision (b)(1) were modeled on the provisions of
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 concerning necessary and indispensable parties. FED. R. Civ. P., Adv.
Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 100 (1966); Kaplan, supra note 53, at 388-89. Rule 19 allows litiga-
tion to go forward in the absence of necessary parties if there is no alternative forum. FED.
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VII actions for broad injunctive relief meet the stringent condi-
tions of subdivision (b)(1), but a similar rationale applies to those
that satisfy the requirements of subdivision (b)(2). If a classwide
injunction is the most efficient means of enforcing substantive
rights, then any other remedy allows some such rights to remain
ineffective. Subdivision (b)(2) does not modify substantive rights
by assuring that they are enforced.2
Apart from the general character of Title VII claims, two spe-
cific provisions of the statute as originally enacted arguably limited
the availability of class actions: section 707, which authorized the
Attorney General to bring pattern-or-practice actions 93 and sec-
tion 706, which restricted the ability of private parties to bring
charges to those parties "claiming to be aggrieved. 9 4 Section 707
arguably granted exclusive authority to the Attorney General to
bring actions requiring classwide relief, but neither the wording of
the section nor its brief legislative history suggests that it was
meant to preclude class actions.95 If other areas of class action liti-
gation are any guide,. the coexistence of public and private reme-
dies is the rule rather than the exception. 6 Section 706 appeared
to limit class actions by allowing charges to be filed only by those
"claiming to be aggrieved." This provision resulted from the Sen-
ate's deletion of a broader provision in the House bill, apparently
at the request of Senator Dirksen, who sought to restrict the scope
of private actions.91 This evidence of legislative intent to limit class
actions was mooted, however, by the 1972 amendments to Title
R. Civ. P. 19(b); see Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
109-10, 110 n.3 (1968). Analogously, a class should be certified if there is no alternative
means of litigation.
" See text and note at note 86 supra.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 261-62 (1964) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976)). Authority to bring pattern-or-practice actions has
now been extended to the EEOC. See note 177 infra.
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 259-61 (1964) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)).
,5 Debate over the provision centered on whether it gave the Attorney General too
much power to bring public actions, with sponsors of Title VII denying that it did. 110
CONG. REC. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); see id. at 12819 (remarks of Sen.
Dirksen); id. at 12722 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). A restrictive view of public actions is
consistent with the legislative compromise limiting enforcement of Title VII primarily to
private actions. See text and notes at notes 29-46 supra.
" See DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago
Experience (pt. 2), 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1273, 1282-87. Cf. Dooley, The
Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L.
Rav. 776, 810-12, 827-33 (1972) (public and private remedies under the securities laws).
' See note 42 supra.
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VII, which restored the language in the original House bill author-
izing charges to be filed "on behalf of a person claiming to be
aggrieved." '98
Although Title VII does not explicitly override rule 23, con-
gressional inaction does not mean that the rule is to be applied
without regard to the substantive and procedural provisions of the
statute. The accommodation between rule 23 and Title VII must
instead be worked out by the federal courts. Application of rule 23
to Title VII claims is part of the larger power of interpretation and
enforcement which Congress conferred on the federal courts in the
compromise over the enforcement provisions of the statute.9 9 In
particular, because the federal courts determine substantive law in
interpreting Title VII, they must also determine how rule 23 is af-
fected by substantive law. To the extent that substantive rules
look to characteristics shared by an entire class, the greater the
likelihood that certification should be granted; to the extent that
they attach significance to the particular facts of each claim, the
greater the likelihood that case-by-case litigation should be pre-
ferred. As I argue in subsequent sections, 100 an examination of sub-
stantive law would: enable the federal courts both to give content
to the uncertain requirements of rule 23 and to give effect to the
substantive policy against discrimination.
C. Early Title VII Class Action Decisions
The early Title VII class action cases were concerned with ex-
tremes. The question usually presented was whether class actions
ever were appropriate in Title VII cases. The answer usually given
was that class actions were especially appropriate. The decisions
that established this proposition came from the Fifth Circuit, 10 1
and created the background against which Congress considered
18 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 104
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). See text and notes at notes 175-176 infra.
"The other potential lawmaking bodies do not have the power to act. Title VII
expressly authorizes the EEOC only to issue procedural rules. Civil Rights Act of 1964
§ 713(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1976); see Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit
Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199, 232 n.141 (1979). The contribution of state law has been fore-
closed by the limited role assigned to state agencies in the enforcement of Title VII and the
small number of Title VII cases that are brought in state court. See Rutherglen, supra, at
231 n.135; note 22 supra.
100 See text and notes at notes 212-305 infra.
101 See text and notes at notes 116-134 infra. This coincided with the Fifth Circuit's
activist role in school desegretation litigation. J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 111-18
(1979).
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amendments to Title VII in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972.102 A further development that affected the course of
the 1972 amendments was the expansive interpretation that Title
VII's substantive provisions received from the federal courts, par-
ticularly from the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.103
The first reported Title VII class action decision was Hall v.
Werthan Bag Corp.10 4 Although it was decided under original rule
23, and rendered by a district court outside the Fifth Circuit, it
influenced the seminal line of early Fifth Circuit decisions. The
named plaintiff had sued on behalf of a class of "all other Negroes
who are similarly situated and affected by the racially discrimina-
tory and unlawful employment practices" of the defendant. °5 The
defendant advanced two arguments against certification. First,
only the named plaintiff's claim was properly before the court be-
cause no other member of the class had exhausted administrative
remedies before the EEOC. Second, there was no common question
as required by original rule 23(a)(3) because the plaintiff had not
challenged an employment practice that expressly discriminated
on the basis of race.106 The first of these arguments raised the
question whether a private person may file an administrative
charge on behalf of another. The court in Hall held that exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies by the named plaintiff alone,
through a suitably broad administrative charge, was sufficient, °7 a
result eventually accepted by Congress °8 and the Supreme
Court.109
The second argument is not as easily dealt with, although the
court in Hall had a ready answer, which has been endlessly re-
peated: "Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimina-
tion. If it exists, it applies throughout the class."110 This statement
has the appearance of logical truth or common-sense inference, but
the logical truth is more limited. At most, it is that an employer
who has discriminated against one employee on the basis of race
102 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1976)).
10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
10, 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
105 Id. at 185.
10 Id. at 186-87.
101 Id. at 188.
10s See text and notes at notes 175-176 infra.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
,0 251 F. Supp. at 186.
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would have discriminated against other employees of the same race
under the same conditions. This says nothing about the likelihood
that such conditions will arise again or that the employer will con-
tinue to discriminate. The common-sense inference is that an em-
ployer who discriminates once is likely to do so again, but its rele-
vance to certification of class actions varies from case to case.
Despite the validity of this inference, the predominance of com-
mon issues necessary for certification may not exist for a variety of
reasons. Employment decisions of a particular employer may not
be made by a single individual; racist attitudes, although pervasive
within an employer, may affect different minority employees in
very different ways; the named plaintiff's claim may be unique or
raise a conflict of interest with other members of the class. Dis-
crimination claims are neither more nor less likely to be valid on a
classwide basis than securities or antitrust claims."1 Certification
is appropriate only to the extent that claims of classwide discrimi-
nation are in fact asserted. Congress recognized the distinctive
character of such claims when it limited the Attorney General's
power to sue to pattern-or-practice actions.112 If this limitation
meant anything at all, it meant that some Title VII claims did not
meet the requirement of classwide discrimination. Such claims
would also fail to satisfy the comparable requirements of rule 23.
In cases such as Hall, in which the plaintiff alleges a general,
but implicit, policy of discrimination, only this issue should be liti-
gated on behalf of the class. Although examination of specific in-
stances of discrimination might be necessary, the class action
should not purport to resolve all such issues. Apart from named
plaintiffs and other class members who actively participate in the
litigation, class members should not be bound, either by the find-
ings as to such incidents or by the failure to litigate them."3 A
claim of implicit discriminatory policies does not authorize the dis-
" See 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, 23.46, at 23-396 to -416; 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 13, § 1781, at 79-97. Cf. Dooley, supra note 96, at 827-33 (evaluating
effects of trend towards liberal certification of securities fraud class actions); 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 177, 195-200 (1976) (criticizing liberal certification of antitrust class actions).
11' See text at note 26 supra. The significance of this limitation diminished after the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 granted the EEOC and the Attorney General
authority to sue in individual cases. See text and note at note 177 infra.
1 A judgment in a class action might not preclude all claims arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the litigated claim because rule 23 might not be satisfied for all
such claims. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1
1973) ("same transaction" test "takes as its model a claim and action by a single plaintiff
against a single defendant").
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trict court to investigate and remedy all claims of discrimination
against a particular defendant. Indeed, the court in Hall did not
attempt such an extension of rule 23. The class was certified only
"insofar as the complaint seeks the removal of the alleged discrimi-
natory policies" and "insofar as it seeks a prohibitive injunc-
tion";114 certification of a class for compensatory relief, as to which
individual questions were likely to predominate, was denied.115
In a series of three cases, the Fifth Circuit transformed the
reasoning of Hall into a doctrine supporting certification of
"across-the-board" Title VII class actions. The first case, Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp.,116 followed the holding of Hall that only
the named plaintiff need exhaust administrative remedies," re-
peating the -argument that "[r]acial discrimination is by definition
class discrimination,"11 and adding that a Title VII plaintiff acted
as a "'private attorney general.' "119 The court's liberal attitude to-
ward certification of Title VII class actions is most apparent in its
conclusory assertion that the requirements of rule 23 had been
met, qualified only by the suggestion that subclasses might be cer-
tified upon remand. 120 The second case, Jenkins v. United Gas
Corp.,2 " added further arguments to support the same conclusion.
Civil rights actions had been recognized by the Advisory Commit-
tee as particularly appropriate for certification under subdivision
(b) (2);122 school desegregation decisions of the Fifth Circuit had es-
tablished a presumption in favor of classwide relief;1 23 and partial
settlement of the named plaintiff's claim was only" 'voluntary ces-
sation of allegedly illegal conduct'" which did not moot the claims
114 251 F. Supp. at 186, 188.
116 The court's own reasoning was that the threat of racial discrimination was a com-
mon question of fact as to injunctive relief but not as to compensation for past discrimina-
tion. Id. at 186. Subsequent cases have distinguished between common questions of class-
wide violations and individual questions of liability to any particular individual for compen-
satory relief. The first is determined in the classwide stage of a bifurcated proceeding and
the second in hearings on individual claims for relief. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359-62 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
772-73 (1976).
'~ 398 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 498.
Id. at 499.
119 Id. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam)). Newman construed the attorney's fees provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976), which is identical to the provision in Title VII.
120 398 F.2d at 499.
2 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
12 Id. at 34.
123 Id. at 34 n.15.
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for individual and classwide relief.124 The district court's finding of
no common question because class members worked in different
jobs was quickly rejected; the plaintiff had alleged the existence of
general discriminatory employment practices, and subclasses could
be certified upon remand to take account of any variation in
claims.1 25
Oatis and Jenkins expressed an attitude; the last case in the
series, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 12 worked a sig-
nificant extension of rule 23. Johnson applied the reasoning of
Hall and Jenkins to allow a discharged black employee to rep-
resent a class that included present employees, despite his appar-
ent failure to seek reinstatement for himself. Because the named
plaintiff had alleged "across-the-board" discrimination in hiring,
firing, promotion, and maintenance of facilities, the court held that
the difference between his status as a discharged employee and
that of present employees did not warrant denial of certification.127
But as Judge Godbold noted in a cautious opinion concurring in
the judgment, the plaintiff had alleged classwide discrimination
only in the most general terms.128 Certification of the class alleged
in the complaint would have encompassed all blacks among the de-
fendant's 1,100 employees at thirty-two different terminals. As
Judge Godbold warned, class actions attacking employment prac-
tices throughout the many facilities of a large corporation could
not be allowed simply on the basis of conclusory allegations of
"across-the-board" discrimination. Instead, the narrow holding of
the court was only that the named plaintiff could represent some
present employees, not that he must be allowed to represent all
present employees.1 29
Even this holding is questionable. The named plaintiff alleged
that he had been unlawfully discharged, but he sought only back
pay, not reinstatement.130 Although the district court could have
granted reinstatement despite the absence of a request in the corn-
Id. at 33 n.11 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).
12" 400 F.2d at 35.
1a 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
127 Id. at 1124. The court also disapproved the district court's postponement of certifi-
cation until the plaintiff had established his individual claim, id., and suggested various
devices to manage the class action on remand, such as subclasses, notice, and an evidentiary
hearing on adequacy of representation, id. at 1124-25.
12 Id. at 1125-26 (Godbold, J., specially concurring).
... Id. at 1126-27 (Godbold, J., specially concurring).
I"0 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 327, 329 (N.D. Ga. 1968),
rev'd, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
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plaint,131 the plaintiff apparently did not intend to seek further
employment with the defendant. If so, he lacked any personal in-
terest in the employment conditions at the defendant's facilities,
or at least one that would have differentiated him from the man in
the street.1 3 2 His avowed interest in obtaining back pay might have
diverged significantly from the interest of present black employees
in improved working conditions. Perhaps the court reasoned im-
plicitly, as other courts have done explicitly, 33 that present em-
ployees would be unlikely to raise discrimination claims on their
own behalf because they were intimidated by threats of retaliation.
The difficulty with this argument is that the class action device
does not eliminate the need for participation by present employ-
ees, who still must come forward to present evidence or at least to
claim individual relief.3 Perhaps the court did not address these
issues becaue it assumed that the plaintiff sought reinstatement,
but the failure to define the class by reference to the named plain-
tiff's individual claim is characteristic of the "across-the-board"
approach to Title VII class actions. If a conclusory allegation of
classwide discrimination is sufficient for certification, courts are
naturally less inclined to examine the particulars of the named
plaintiff's individual claim.
The decisions of the Fifth Circuit influenced early develop-
ments in other circuits, either on the question of certification or on
related issues. In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,"3 5 the Seventh
Circuit ordered certification of a plant-wide class of past and pre-
sent female employees in an action attacking the employer's se-
niority and job classification systems. The court followed the Fifth
Circuit in requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies only by
the named plaintiff, not the class as a whole, and it expanded the
class to include compensatory relief, rejecting the contrary holding
s31 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
2 The plaintiff's failure to seek reinstatement deprived him of standing to challenge
conditions of employment. The standing requirement of injury-in-fact presumes that the
plaintiff actually seeks relief for the injury in fact alleged. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 22, at
184-91. Without standing, the employee cannot represent the class. See note 137 infra.
133 E.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1011 (1975). The lower federal courts are divided on the question of representation of
present and future employees by past employees. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT" DISCRIMINATION LAW 1089 & n.25 (1976); id. at 277-78 & nn.13-14 (Supp. 1979).
2'3 See note 115 supra.
t35 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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in Hall.136 Early decisions of other circuits justified liberal certifi-
cation of class actions with less discussion, either by reducing the
requirements of rule 23 to the independent requirement of stand-
ing,13 7 or by a conclusory assertion that the requirements of the
rule had been satisfied.13 8 Still other decisions applied the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning to support broad investigations by the EEOC of
individual charges, an issue related to exhaustion of administrative
remedies on behalf of the class. 3 9 Only one early court of appeals
decision affirmed a denial of class certification, and that was on a
record showing that classwide relief would have been denied on the
merits.140
Like the procedural law of employment -discrimination, the
substantive law also was liberally interpreted in favor of plaintiffs.
The most important case was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' 41 in
which the Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits neutral em-
ployment practices that are not intentionally discriminatory, but
that have a disproportionate adverse impact upon a protected
group, resulting in underrepresentation of that group in the em-
ployer's work force. 42 If the plaintiff carries the burden of showing
that an employment practice has a disproportionate adverse im-
pact, then the defendant must show that the practice is justified
by "business necessity" or that it is "related to job perform-
136 Id. at 719-20. In Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), the court extended the reasoning of Bowe to permit con-
sideration of classwide relief despite the absence of class certification before judgment on
the merits. But see id. at 1207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
,37 Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1971) (discharged employ-
ees seeking reinstatement can represent present employees); Tipler v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 130 (6th Cir. 1971) (same but no class certification sought).
Standing of the named plaintiff to raise claims asserted on behalf of the class is a further
requirement, in addition to those listed in rule 23, for certification of a class action. 3B J.
MOORE, supra note 12, 23.04[2], at 23-120 to -128, 23-137 to -147; 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 13, § 1761, at 584-92; 7A id. § 1776, at 38-41.
138 Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743, 749 (6th Cir. 1971) (discharged employee
seeking reinstatement can represent present employees); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 446 F.2d 763, 765-66 (8th Cir. 1971) (teachers' association could represent class of 20
teachers because of employees' reluctance to bring individual actions); Parham v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir 1970) (denial of relief to rejected applicant
does not bar relief to class of employees and applicants).
,39 Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 41-42 (4th Cir. 1971); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v.
EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969).
140 Williams v. American Saint Gobain Corp., 447 F.2d 561, 568 (10th Cir. 1971). An-
other decision vacated a classwide injunction because the plaintiff had not brought the case
as a class action. Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1971).
141 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14" Id. at 430-32.
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ance." ' Griggs thus established a theory of liability designed for
classwide application. Evidence of disproportionate impact inevit-
ably is evidence that an entire class has suffered from a violation of
Title VII.144 The implications of these developments, both proce-
dural and substantive, were taken up by Congress when it con-
sidered amendments to Title VII in the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972.
D. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
The debate over the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972,)145 like the debate over the original procedural provisions of
Title VII,146 concentrated upon the powers of the EEOC. The role
of class actions remained a secondary issue. Supporters of vigorous
enforcement again sought to obtain authority for the EEOC to is-
sue cease-and-desist orders, although without denying individuals
a private right of action. Their opponents sought to preserve the
original distribution of power, which vested adjudicative authority
in the federal courts. They argued that the federal courts enforced
the statute effectively enough, and indeed that the class action de-
vice enabled them to enforce it too effectively, by greatly increas-
ing the exposure of employers to liability for back pay.
The House passed a bill that both denied cease-and-desist au-
thority to the EEOC and eliminated the use of class actions in Ti-
tle VII cases. The Senate bill also denied cease-and-desist author-
ity to the EEOC, but it generally endorsed the status quo,
including the existing use of class actions. The conference commit-
tee adopted the more liberal Senate legislation almost in its en-
tirety, and it became law. The most important substantive amend-
ments to be enacted were those extending coverage to the federal
government, state and local governments, educational institutions,
and smaller employers. Like the refusal to grant cease-and-desist
authority to the EEOC, extension of the statute's coverage
amounted to a broad endorsement of the procedures and decisions
of the federal courts. The existing enforcement mechanism was
14S Id. at 431. For a more extensive account of Griggs and subsequent developments,
see Rutherglen, supra note 99, at 233 & nn.144-146.
144 See Rissetto, Employment Discrimination Class Actions, [1979] 1 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 101:250, 252. See also Connolly & Connolly, supra note 13, at 188-91.
1 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1976)).
146 See text and notes at notes 29-42 supra.
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preserved and its jurisdiction was enlarged.
Congressional consideration of cease-and-desist authority in
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 began favora-
bly." 7 Committees in both the House and Senate reported bills
granting such authority, but in both houses, these provisions were
deleted by amendments on the floor. In the House, a bill sponsored
by Representative Hawkins 14 was reported favorably by the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor.149 It established an enforcement
scheme that was a hybrid of administrative and judicial proceed-
ings. In both individual and pattern-or-practice cases, the EEOC
possessed the power to issue cease-and-desist orders, subject to en-
forcement and review in the courts of appeals. 50 Individuals re-
tained the right to sue if the Commission found no reasonable
cause to support a charge or failed to act within a specified pe-
riod. '5 The Committee justified these provisions on the grounds of
increasing caseload, inadequate enforcement by existing public au-
thorities, and administrative expertise. 52 In both the majority and
minority reports, classwide relief was mentioned only in connection
with pattern-or-practice cases. 5s
When the Hawkins bill reached the floor of the House, it was
replaced by a substitute offered by Representative Erlenborn,' 5' a
member of the Committee minority, and it passed the House in
this form. 55 Like the minority report, the Erlenborn bill was gen-
erally hostile to expanding liability under Title VII.5 6 The bill also
147 Several earlier attempts had failed. Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824, 829-36 (1972).
18 H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in SUSCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d CONG., 2d SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 at 326-41 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
141 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. 1 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2137, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 61.
150 H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Seass. §§ 4, 5 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 148, at 33-46.
151 Id. § 8(0), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 54-58.
152 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sass. 8-14 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2143-50, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 68-74.
1 3 Id. at 13-14, 65-66, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2149-50,
2174, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 73-74, 124-25.
4 H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 148, at 141-47; 117 CONG. REC. 31979-80 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 148, at 141-47.
"1 117 CONG. REc. 32111-12 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148,
at 312-17.
' See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. 58-67 (1971) (minority views), reprinted
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specifically restricted the use of class actions in Title VII litigation.
It limited compensatory relief to persons named in charges filed
with the Commission.15" This provision would have overruled the
holding in several cases that a private plaintiff could exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies on behalf of a class, and it would have se-
verely curtailed, if not entirely eliminated, class actions in Title
VII cases.15 The Erlenborn bill also reflected some compromises
with the Hawkins bill. It increased the limitations period for filing
administrative charges and for commencing judicial proceedings,15 '
and it granted the EEOC the power to sue in individual cases.160
In the Senate, civil rights supporters obtained a more
favorable bill. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
reported a bill, sponsored by Senator Williams, which authorized
the EEOC to issue cease-and-desist orders.11 The Senate commit-
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2167-76, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 148, at 118-27; 117 CONG. Rac. 31963-64 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins & Rep.
Reid); id. at 31972-74 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn & Del. Fauntroy), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 202-06, 226-33; Sape & Hart, supra note 147, at 838-40.
157 H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(e) (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 148, at 147. The provision limited the remedial powers of the district courts:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a
member of a union or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual... neither filed a
charge nor was named in a charge or amendment thereto ....
Id. Since this provision applied only to actions under section 706 by individuals or the
EEOC, it did not apply to pattern-or-practice actions by the Attorney General under section
707, which remained unaffected by the Erlenborn bill. See id.
I" Classwide relief prohibiting future discrimination, and perhaps even classwide com-
pensatory relief if sufficient class members had been named in the charge, might still have
been available. Nevertheless, the provision was characterized repeatedly in the House de-
bate and in the conference report as a complete bar to class actions. H.R. REP. No. 899, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2179, 2183, and
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1838; S. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2179, 2183, and in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1816; 117 CONG. Rac. 31978 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 231; id. at 32097 (remarks of Rep.
Abzug), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 243; id. at 32107 (remarks of
Rep. Leggett), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 276. The provision also
was tied to a further restriction limiting back pay to a two-year period before judicial pro-
ceedings were commenced. 117 CONG. REC. 31973 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn), .re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 231.
'5, Compare H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4, 80) (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 148, at 36-37, 55 with H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b), (c) (1971),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 144-45.
160 H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c) (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 148, at 144-45.
161 S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 148, at 377-93; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
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tee offered the same reasons as the House committee in support of
cease-and-desist authority: efficient enforcement, the growing
backlog of charges at the EEOC, the crowded federal court docket,
and administrative expertise. 1 2 The Williams bill also transferred
authority over pattern-or-practice cases to the EEOC,63 and pre-
served the private right of action.16 4 In addition, the committee ap-
proved a provision allowing charges to be filed "by or on behalf of
a person claiming to be aggrieved," or by an officer or employee of
the Commission.16 5 In doing so, it endorsed the use of class actions
in the following terms: "This section is not intended in any way to
restrict the filing of class complaints. The committee agrees with
the courts that title VII actions are by their very nature class com-
plaints, and that any restriction on such actions would greatly un-
dermine the effectiveness of title VII."V es
Senator Dominick was the only dissenting member of the com-
mittee.167 When the Williams bill reached the floor of the Senate,
he introduced a substitute that deprived the EEOC of cease-and-
desist authority,"'8 but which did not, as he emphasized, "limit
class actions."' 9 This departure from the conservative position in
the House apparently resulted from a Justice Department memo-
randum supporting class actions.17 0 After extensive parliamentary
maneuvering, the sponsors of the Williams bill were eventually
HISTORY, supra note 148, at 410.
102 S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIvE His-
TORY, supra note 148, at 426-28.
163 S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1971), pertinent portion reprinted in LEGISLATVE
HISTORY, supra note 148, at 393-95.
1" Id. § 4(a), pertinent portion reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at
390-93.
,15 Id., reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 377.
166 S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971) (footnote omitted), reprinted in LEG-
ISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 436. The footnote in this passage cited, among other
cases, Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968), and Jenkins v. United
Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968), discussed in text and notes at notes 116-125 supra.
107 He offered the same arguments as the minority report in the House. S. REP. No. 415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 85-88 (1971) (views of Sen. Dominick), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 148, at 493-96.
' Amendment No. 611 to S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 553-58; 118 CONG. REC. 39739-40 (1971), reprinted in LEG-
ISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 549.
109 117 CONG. REc. 39739 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 148, at
549; accord, 118 CONG. REc. 698 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 148,
at 695. Senator Dominick had earlier offered a bill similar to the Erlenborn bill which re-
stricted class actions. S. 2617, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 148, at 335-41.
170 See Sape & Hart, supra note 147, at 841-42.
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forced to accept a version of the Dominick amendment. As the bill
passed the Senate, it denied cease-and-desist authority to the
EEOC but provided for expedited judicial proceedings.17 1
The principal discussion of class actions on the floor of the
Senate was in a section-by-section analysis prepared by Senator
Williams. It repeated the Committee's view that private actions
were expected to be the exception, 172 but also endorsed existing
Title VII class action decisions:
[I]t is not intended that any of the provisions contained
therein are designed to affect the present use of class action
lawsuits under Title VII in conjunction with Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The courts have been par-
ticularly cognizant of the fact that claims under Title VII in-
volve the vindication of a major public interest, and that any
action under the Act involves considerations beyond those
raised by the individual claimant. As a consequence, the lead-
ing cases in this area to date have recognized that Title VII
claims are necessarily class action complaints and that, ac-
cordingly, it is not necessary that each individual entitled to
relief under the claim be named in the original charge or in
the claim for relief.1 73
The remaining references to class actions were made only in
passing.17 4
In the conference committee, the Senate's position favoring
existing class action decisions prevailed. The language in the
House bill requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies for
each class member was rejected as part of a compromise,17 5 and the
171 Amendment No. 884 to S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1499-1504; 118 CONG. RIc. 3978-80 (1972), reprinted in LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, 1556-61; see Sape & Hart, supra note 147, at 843-45.
172 Compare 118 CONG. REC. 4942 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATwE HISTORY, supra note
148, at 1772 with S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 148, at 432.
173 118 CONG. REC. 4942 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at
1772.
174 See 117 CONG. Rac. 39739 (1971) (Sen. Dominick's claim that his amendment had
no effect on class actions), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 549; 118 id.
at 698 (1972) (same), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 695; id. at 3369
(Sen. Hruska making the same claim for an amendment that he had offered), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1398; id. at 3391, 4076, 4080, 4081-82 (Sens. Hruska
& Javitz characterizing pattern-or-practice cases as class actions), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1446, 1574, 1586, 1589.
175 The compromise also authorized "any other equitable relief that the court deems
1980]
The University of Chicago Law Review
language in the Senate bill allowing charges to be filed "on behalf
of a person claiming to be aggrieved" was retained.17 6 On the re-
maining procedural issues, the House and Senate were already in
agreement: authority to sue in individual and pattern-or-practice
cases was transferred to the EEOC, but only in cases involving pri-
vate employers. 17 Individuals retained the right to sue,178 and the
limitation periods for filing charges with the EEOC and commenc-
ing individual actions in court were extended.17 9 In a section-by-
section analysis of the conference committee bill, Senator Williams
repeated his endorsement of class actions,180 and after brief debate,
the bill easily passed both houses."8 '
Apart from the extension of coverage to government, educa-
appropriate" and dated the two-year limitation on back pay according to the more liberal
Senate pro~ision. It followed the House bill, however, in limiting remedies to intentional
violations of the statute. H.R. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1972), reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2179, 2183, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
148, at 1838-39; S. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2179, 2183, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1816-
17.
178 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat.
104 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). The Senate provision for expedited
court proceedings also was retained. Id., 86 Stat. 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5)
(1976)).
177 Id. §§ 4(a), 5, 86 Stat. 104, 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-6(c)
(1976)). Special procedures applied to charges of discrimination against the federal govern-
ment, and the Attorney General was granted exclusive authority to commence actions
against state and local governments. Id. §§ 4(a), 11, 86 Stat. 104-05, 111 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-16 (1976)). The authority of the Attorney General to bring
pattern-or-practice actions against state and local governments later was clarified by Reor-
ganization Plan No. 1 of 1978 § 5, 3 C.F.R. 321, 322 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. App. at 289-90 (Supp. II 1978). See generally Rosoff, Reorganization Plan No. 1
Under Title VII, 30 LAB. L.J. 268 (1979).
178 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat.
106 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)).
17 Id., 86 Stat. 105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f)(1) (1976)).
180 See text at note 173 supra. He added only that the provision in the Erlenborn bill
restricting class actions had been rejected. 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Williams); id. at 7565 (remarks of Rep. Perkins), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 148, at 1847. The section-by-section analysis was not part of the conference committee
report, although it was distributed in both houses, and Senator Williams and Representative
Perkins were chairmen of the conferees from each chamber.
I81 118 CONG. REc. 7170, 7553 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
148, at 1853-54, 1872-75. In the House, Representative Erlenborn complained that the
House conferees had given in on 18 out of the 21 major differences between his bill and the
more liberal Senate bill, in effect partially reversing the House vote substituting the
Erlenborn bill for the more liberal Hawkins bill. See id. at 7567, 7568, reprinted in LEGISLA-
TwE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1856, 1859.
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tional institutions, and small employers, 8 2 the amendments to the
substantive provisions of Title VII did little to change existing
law.18s Attempts to codify the theory of disproportionate adverse
impact announced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.184 failed in both
houses, 185 but in other places in the legislative history the decision
was cited favorably1 86 or fell within a general endorsement of ex-
isting case law.1 87
The overall effect of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 was to leave Title VII intact but to expand the availability
of judicial remedies, both procedurally by granting the EEOC the
power to sue and easing the restrictions on individual suits, and
substantively by expanding the coverage of the statute to reach
more employers. Although civil rights supporters hoped that public
enforcement by the EEOC would play a larger role, private actions
and class actions were recognized as the next best alternative. A
serious attempt to abolish the use of class actions was defeated.
181 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2, 11, 86 Stat.
103, 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-16 (1976)); see Sape & Hart, supra
note 147, at 847-62.
181 See Sape & Hart, supra note 147, at 880-88.
184 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
188 The Hawkins bill reported favorably by the House Committee on Education and
Labor contained language enacting the theory into law. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 8(c) (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 50-51; H.R. REP. No.
238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22, 30 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S, CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2137, 2155-57, 2165, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 80-82, 90; 117 CONG.
REc. 31961 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Perkins), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
148, at 198. But this provision was deleted when the Erlenborn bill was substituted on the
floor of the House. In the Senate a provision was passed deleting the requirement in Title
VII that liability be imposed only for intentional violations of the statute, Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), but it was rejected by the conference com-
mittee. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 148, at 1783; see 118 CONG. REc. 4942 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1773-74.
188 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 21, 24 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2144, 2156, 2159, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
148, at 68, 81, 84; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 & n.1, 14 (1971), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 414 & n.1, 423; 118 CONG. REc. 697 (1972) (remarks
of Sen. Dominick), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 692; id. at 3371
(remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1403. The
only criticism of Griggs was indirect, through criticism of an EEOC staff memorandum ar-
guing that relocation of businesses from cities to suburbs had a disproportionate adverse
impact upon minority workers. 118 CONG. REC. 4924-29 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Allen), re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1731-43.
187 118 CONG. REc. 4940, 7166 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1769; id. at 7564 (remarks of Rep. Perkins), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 1844.
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But if Congress did not overrule existing class action decisions,
neither did it enact them into statutory law. Passages in the legis-
lative history approved the reasoning of judicial decisions, but the
only congressional action was refusal to overrule them. Such inac-
tion reveals no intent to freeze existing law.188 Congressional en-
dorsement of judicial procedures and judicial decisions was
equivalent not to enactment of past decisions into statutory law,
but to endorsement of the evolutionary process by which case law
is made. By approving judicial methods, Congress did not favor
past decisions over future developments, especially in areas in
which the Supreme Court had not yet spoken.189 Subsequent de-
velopments confirm this conclusion.
E. Subsequent Title VII Class Action Decisions
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 reinforced
existing trends in favor of liberal certification of Title VII class ac-
tions. Several decisions relied explicitly on the legislative history of
the Act.190 Many others followed earlier decisions without referring
to it,191 which was not surprising, because the Act left the status
quo undisturbed. Most of the courts of appeals that had not al-
ready endorsed the presumption in favor of certification of Title
VII class actions did so, and in the other circuits, district courts
accepted the presumption. 192 There were exceptions to this nation-
wide trend, but they remained in large part responses to the facts
18 See text and notes at notes 166, 173, 180 supra.
188 Accord, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346 & n.28,
354 & n.39 (1977).
190 E.g., Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 662 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977);
Williams v. TVA, 552 F.2d 691, 693-94 (6th Cir. 1976); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d
661, 663-64 & n.12 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
1"1 E.g., Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 829-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 896 (1977); Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1976); Senter v. General
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 520-26 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 409-14 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
192 1st Circuit: Brown Univ. v. Lamphere, 553 F.2d 714, 719 (1st Cir. 1977) (dictum);
Beasley v. Griffin, 427 F. Supp. 801, 802-03 (D. Mass. 1977). 2d Circuit: Acha v. Beame, 438
F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Women's
Comm. for Equal Opportunity v. NBC, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Grogg v.
General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 9th Circuit: Waters v. Heublein,
Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977). 10th Circuit:
Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1975). D.C. Circuit: Hackley
v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 151 n.177 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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of particular cases. 93 Only a few cases, all decided by district
courts, offered general arguments against liberal certification." 4
The precedential effect of the early Title VII class action decisions
and the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 were sufficient to assure continued momentum toward
liberal certification.
This trend was halted, if not reversed, by the Supreme Court's
decision in East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez.1 5
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez were three Mexican-American employ-
ees of East Texas Motor Freight who were city drivers at its San
Antonio terminal. They had applied for transfers to jobs as line
drivers, on routes between metropolitan areas, but their applica-
tions were denied. East Texas Motor Freight did not permit trans-
fers from city driver to line driver positions, and the applicable
collective bargaining agreement did not permit city drivers to use
their seniority in city driver jobs to obtain line driver jobs. The
plaintiffs then filed charges with the EEOC alleging that the no-
transfer and seniority policies were discriminatory. After exhaust-
ing administrative remedies, they sued in federal district court.
Their action was brought on behalf of all Mexican-American and
black city drivers in Texas covered by the collective bargaining
agreement and all Mexican-American and black applicants for jobs
as line drivers with East Texas Motor Freight. The plaintiffs failed
to move for certification of a class action, however, and stipulated
that trial would be limited to their individual claims. 196 After trial
of these claims, the district court dismissed the claims on behalf of
the class, citing the plaintiffs' failure to pursue them. The district
court also relied on the fact that a large majority of union mem-
bers, most of whom were members of the proposed class, had re-
193 E.g., Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 540 F.2d 699, 705-10 (4th Cir. 1976); Bai-
ley v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 528 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052
(1977); Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1975); Taylor v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 270-71 (10th Cir. 1975).
"I E.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24, 36-38 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Wil-
liams v. Wallace Silversmiths, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 633, 635-36 (D. Conn. 1976), appeal dis-
missed, 566 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Target Stores, Inc., 11 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 775, 776 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Mason v. Calgon Corp., 63 F.R.D. 98, 103-08 (W.D. Pa. 1974);
Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D. 91, 98-100 (D.D.C. 1973); Blankenship v. Wometco
Blue Circle, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 308, 309 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53
F.R.D. 412, 413-15 (D. Colo. 1971); Gresham v. Ford Motor Co., 53 F.R.D. 105, 106-07 (N.D.
Ga. 1970).
199 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
1 Id. at 400. The district court's opinion is not reported.
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jected a proposal to merge city driver and line driver seniority lists,
one of the remedies sought by plaintiffs. 19
The court of appeals reversed the district court in almost all
respects. 98 It held that a class action should have been certified,
relying almost entirely on the presumption in favor of certification.
It relieved plaintiffs of the duty to move for certification by requir-
ing the district court to raise the issue itself. The opinion mini-
mized the conflict of interest between the plaintiffs- and the mem-
bers of the class, as revealed by the union vote rejecting merger of
the seniority lists, by characterizing it as a disagreement only over
the desired remedy."99 The court of appeals went on to find that
trial on the individual claims had implicitly included the classwide
claims °0 and that these should have been resolved in favor of the
class." '
Confronted with this extreme application of the presumption
in favor of certification, the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning
of the court of appeals and held that the district court had cor-
rectly denied certification. The Court cautiously acknowledged
that "suits alleging, racial or ethnic discrimination are often by
their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs, ' 20 2 but it
applied this presumption only to the requirement of commonality
in rule 23(a)(2), not to the further, constitutionally based, require-
ment of adequacy of representation in rule 23(a)(4).2 03 The plain-
tiffs' representation of the class was inadequate for the reasons
pointed out by the district court. It was also inadequate for an-
other reason: the named plaintiffs were not members of the class
they sought to represent because their individual claims had failed
on the merits.2 4 This last reason was particularly powerful on the
facts of Rodriguez itself, because the plaintiffs had neglected to
raise the issue of certification in a timely fashion in the district
197 Id. The district court also found against the plaintiffs on their individual claims,
holding that the defendant's no-transfer and seniority policies were not discriminatory and
that the plaintiffs were not otherwise qualified to be line drivers.
195 Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974).
199 Id. at 50-52.
100 Id. at 52.
'0' Id. at 52-61. It also held that the named plaintiffs were entitled to have their appli-
cations considered on the merits when vacancies arose. Id. at 63.
202 431 U.S. at 405.
203 Id. at 405-06.
'0, Id. at 403-04. The plaintiffs also stipulated that they had not suffered from discrimi-
nation in hiring. Id. at 404.
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court.20 5 As the Supreme Court recognized at the time, and has
emphasized more recently, 06 such reasoning cannot readily be ex-
tended to cases in which the certification ruling precedes a decision
on the merits.
A common but hardly universal reaction to Rodriguez by the
lower federal courts has been a reexamination of the presumption
in favor of certification and revived caution in applying it to Title
VII class actions.07 The precedential significance of Rodriguez is
limited, however. Its holding does no more than reject an extreme
application of the presumption in favor of certification. The Su-
preme Court probably did not grant certiorari to lay down a gen-
eral rule, since it considered Rodriguez as part of a group of cases
principally concerned with the legality of hiring and seniority prac-
tices in the trucking industry.2 0 8 The Court's opinion only cor-
rected an egregious mistake.
Nevertheless, Rodriguez has caused some lower federal courts
to depart from the trend toward liberal certification 209 while others
have continued to adhere to it. °1 0 Post-Rodriguez decisions within
the same circuit have applied inconsistent reasoning, even if they
105 Id. at 405.
, Id. at 406 n.12. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless has extended this reasoning to cases
in which the district court denied certification with or without a hearing. Armour v. City of
Anniston, 597 F.2d 46, 48-51 (5th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 590 F.2d 140,
143 (5th Cir. 1979); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 991-96 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 1334 (1980).
The Supreme Court has cast doubt on these decisions in Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank
v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. 1166 (1980), and United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct.
1202 (1980), which held that mootness of the named plaintiff's individual claim does not
preclude appellate review of the district court's denial of certification. Accord, Alexander v.
Gino's, Inc., 621 F.2d 71, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1980).
0 E.g., Kelley v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 584 F.2d 34, 35 (4th Cir. 1978); Satterwhite v. City
of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 991-94 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 1334
(1980).
20 On the same day that certiorari was granted in Rodriguez, it was also granted in
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See 425 U.S. 990
(1976). The decision in Teamsters partially or wholly overruled over 30 decisions in six cir-
cuits, 431 U.S. at 378-79 & nn.2 & 3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
and the judgments against the union in Rodriguez were remanded for reconsideration in
light of Teamsters. 431 U.S. at 406 n.13.
'10 E.g., Davis v. Roadway Express Co., 590 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1979); Shelton v.
Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1312-13 (4th Cir. 1978); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581
F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (8th Cir. 1978); Shipp v. Memphis Area Office, Tenn. Dep't of Empl.
Security, 581 F.2d 1167, 1170-72 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); Doninger
v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977).
210 E.g., Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 92-95 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978).
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have not reached inconsistent results.211 Such coexisting lines of
authority have aggravated the chronic uncertainty surrounding the
application of rule 23. Whether any particular case will be certified
as a class action depends less on rules of law than on the district
judge's selection of precedent.
II. A GENERAL METHOD OF ANALYSIS
A. Replacing the Presumption in Favor of Certification
In the preceding sections, I have argued that the reasons ad-
vanced for liberal certification of Title VII class actions are inade-
quate. Allegations of employment discrimination are not "by defi-
nition" allegations of classwide discrimination in any sense
relevant to class actions under rule 23. The connection between
allegations of discrimination and certification of class actions is not
logical, but empirical. It counsels not an inquiry into meaning, but
an examination of evidence. Many Title VII claims appropriately
seek "final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with re-
spect to the class as a whole"; 212 whether any particular claim does
so depends on the facts of each case. The Advisory Committee
note recommending the suitability of civil rights cases for certifica-
tion under rule 23(b)(2) is not authoritative. Congressional policy,
as expressed in Title VII and its legislative history, does not reflect
a judgment of sufficient force and clarity to displace the usual op-
eration of rule 23.
The substantive policies that favor liberal certification of class
actions instead have been formulated by the judiciary. The legal
and moral force of Brown v. Board of Education21 has caused the
federal courts to favor claims of racial discrimination, most signifi-
cantly in Title VII cases through judicial creation of the theory of
disproportionate adverse impact. The substantive policy favoring
discrimination claims has also affected the procedural rules by
which such claims are enforced, but often in a haphazard way, as
the presumption in favor of certification illustrates. If the pre-
2 Compare Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 131, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
with Rosario v. New York Times Co., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 493, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
For accounts of conflicting decisions, see I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar, 78 F.R.D. 549, 554-55 (N.D.
Cal. 1978); 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 394, 400 & n.48 (1976). See also Comment, The Proper
Scope of Representation, supra note 13, at 182; Comment, Title VII Class Action Certifica-
tion in Third Circuit District Courts, 24 VnL. L. REv. 295 (1978).
212 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). See -note 56 supra.
213 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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sumption applies regardless of the merits of the named plaintiff's
claims, it permits abuse of the class action device as much as it
furthers the substantive policy against discrimination.
It follows that the presumption in favor of certification must
be tempered by closer examination of the character and merits of
the named plaintiff's claims. The validity of the argument for lib-
eral certification depends on the nature of the claims asserted by
the named plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of the class.
The existence of an empirical connection between claims of indi-
vidual discrimination and claims of classwide discrimination must
be determined on the facts of each case, as must the likelihood
that the plaintiff will succeed in obtaining classwide injunctive or
declaratory relief. Likewise, the relevance of the policy against dis-
crimination depends on the nature and substantiality of the plain-
tiff's claims. To the extent that the policy against discrimination
has given rise to identifiable substantive rules, like the doctrine of
disproportionate adverse impact, its effect on certification depends
on whether those rules have justifiably been invoked on behalf of
the class. To the extent that substantive policy has given rise to a
general judgment, not embodied in any particular substantive rule,
that victims of discrimination deserve relief regardless of procedu-
ral obstacles, its application depends squarely on the merits of the
claim asserted on behalf of the class. If the claim is frivolous, the
policy has no force because the claim is not being made on behalf
of genuine victims of discrimination. The policy presumes the sub-
stantiality of the claim asserted on behalf of the class.
Examination of the merits is also necessary to prevent abuse
of the class action device by plaintiffs and their attorneys, who
have incentives to add class action allegations in order to obtain
settlement leverage. Plaintiffs may seek better settlement of their
individual claims, and class attorneys increased attorney's fees, in
exchange for concessions on the class claims. 14 Even weak class
21, Dam, supra note 64, at 56-61; Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settle-
ment, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1976). For instances in which weak or frivolous claims have
been buttressed with class action allegations, see note 257 infra. For examples of particu-
larly egregious misuse of class actions by attorneys, see Munoz v. Arizona State Univ., 19
Empl. Prac. Dec. 6575 (D. Ariz. 1979) (class attorney's "production line" representation in
this and other Title VII class actions); Smith v. Josten's Am. Yearbook Co., 78 F.R.D. 154,
163-68 (D. Kan. 1978) (same attorney had 27 Title VII class actions pending in district and
submitted form papers with little variation in each case); Peak v. Topeka Hous. Auth., 78
F.R.D. 78, 80-85 (D. Kan. 1978) (general allegations and form complaint by same attorney
as in Smith). But cf. Johnson v. Wentz Equip. Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1499 (D. Kan.
1977) (approving class action settlement negotiated by same attorney as in Smith).
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claims may induce employers to settle. Although the chance of suc-
cess is small, the employer's exposure to litigation expenses and a
judgment in favor of the class may be so great that settlement may
be the most rational course.215 The cost of this strategy to plaintiffs
and their attorneys is minimal. The liberal rules of pleading in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow general allegations of class-
wide discrimination216 while the presumption in favor of certifica-
tion weakens the requirements of rule 23. Although some decisions
impose a requirement of specific pleading of certain class action
allegations, 17 rule 23 is not easily made to yield specific require-
ments.1 8 In any event, pleadings that have been found to be inade-
quate remain open to amendment, subject only to the loose re-
quirements of good faith pleading. 219 In theory, district judges
could exercise their broad powers under rule 23 to prevent such
abuse, but they remain unable to examine the many tactical judg-
ments involved in a complicated case.220 For the same reason, they
are unable to impose defendant's attorney's fees upon many plain-
tiffs who bring meritless actions. District judges can impose attor-
ney's fees on plaintiffs under Title VII only if they first find that
the plaintiff's claim is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion."22' This requirement precludes liability for attorney's fees in
215 Class actions increase each element of the defendant's potential costs: litigation ex-
penses, liability to plaintiffs for relief and for attorney's fees, and injury from adverse pub-
licity. Even if the chance of success on the class claims is small, the increase in the defen-
dant's potential costs may increase the risk of litigation sufficiently to make settlement
attractive. See Dam, supra note 64, at 59.
Similar costs in derivative suits, and similar potential for abuse, have led state legisla-
tures to impose restrictions upon such actions. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548-49, 555-56 (1949).
216 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); FED. R. Civ. P. 8. There is no explicit
requirement for specific pleading of class action allegations. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9, 23.
217 Even decisions which have insisted on specificity, however, have permitted plaintiffs
to flesh out the general allegations of the complaint through discovery and other means. See
note 255 infra.
218 See text and notes at notes 58-63 supra.
2'9 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962); FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2), 11, 15(a); ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2).
220 Posner, supra note 86, at 441; Developments, supra note 5, at 1538.
221 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). Nonetheless, attor-
ney's fees are awarded to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course. Id. at 417. This inter-
pretation of section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), aggravates the problem of frivo-
lous class action allegations. The size of attorney's fees awards usually increases with the
extent of the remedy, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir.
1974); Heinsz, Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable
Standard, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 259, 265 (1977). Plaintiffs' attorneys thus have much to gain,
but relatively little to lose, by alleging classwide discrimination. A one-sided interpretation
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all but the weakest cases.
Instead of pursuing the elusive goal of reducing rule 23 to a
series of specific pleading requirements, or taking the opposite
course of relying ever more heavily on the discretion of the district
judge, a more realistic alternative is to require the named plaintiff
to reveal the merits of both the individual and class claims he as-
serts. Pretrial adjudication under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is not usually accomplished by specific pleading, but by ex-
amining the merits through discovery and summary judgment.222
The same course should be followed with respect to certification of
class actions. An extended inquiry into the issue of certification is
more likely to be profitable if it parallels an inquiry into the mer-
its. As the Federal Rules recognize,2 3 litigation resources are bet-
ter invested in deciding procedural issues related to the merits
than in technicalities which require legal and factual research of no
further utility. Rulings on issues unrelated to the merits may also
disrupt the settlement process, even in the absence of abuse. If cer-
tification of a class action erodes the bargaining position of the de-
fendant,"4 it should be preceded by a finding of some likelihood of
success on the merits. Otherwise, the settlement process is skewed
in favor of plaintiffs without any basis in the merits of the plain-
tiff's claims.
The underlying requirements of rule 23, that classwide adjudi-
cation would be more efficient than individual actions and that
members of the class be treated fairly, are more easily applied af-
ter an examination of the merits. The determination whether the
named plaintiff's claim has questions of law or fact in common
with those of the class or whether it is typical of such claims re-
quires an analysis of the legal theory and evidence that the plain-
tiff is likely to offer on the merits. An examination of the merits is
of the statute's neutral provisions is not required by its brief legislative history. See Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419-20 (1978); Heinsz, supra, at 262, 268-74.
It neglects the desirability, ex ante, of deterring claims that are weak, but not frivolous or
likely to be found frivolous, and the unfairness, ex post, of imposing the cost of litigation on
successful defendants. Dam, supra note 64, at 71-72.
212 C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 566-72 (2d ed. 1947); Roberts,
Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 390, 396-97 (1980). This
is consistent with the general principle that federal pleading rules are designed to facilitate
judgment on the merits rather than encourage resort to technicalities of procedure, Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
223 FED. R. Civ. P. 1; 2 J. MOORE, supra note 12, 1 1.13[1], at 281-86; 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 13, § 1029, at 129.
224 See text and notes at notes 214-215 supra.
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also likely to reveal whether the named plaintiff can forcefully pre-
sent the class claims and whether his individual claim conflicts
with the claims of the class. Indeed, after East Texas Motor
Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, a finding that the named plain-
tiff's individual claim lacks merit disqualifies him from subse-
quently obtaining certification of a class action.22 5 Even application
of the technical requirement of numerosity would be aided by an
analysis of the merits, which would reveal the breadth of the class
for which the claim might successfully be asserted.
The precertification inquiry into the merits should be accom-
plished by adapting the usual pretrial device of summary judg-
ment. 2 6 The plaintiff should be required to present evidence and
affidavits sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment
by the defendant. The standard of sufficiency should be that nor-
mally used, but the burden of producing evidence should be re-
versed: the plaintiff should be required to present sufficient evi-
dence and affidavits so that, resolving all questions of credibility
and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, he would prevail
as a matter of law on both the individual and class claims. 227 Certi-
fication should be denied if he failed to make a sufficient showing
on either claim, or, of course, if he failed to satisfy the require-
ments of rule 23.
The plaintiff should bear the burden of production because he
is more likely to produce information relevant to the certification
decision. Defendants' motions for summary judgment are usually
denied because the defendant has produced too little evidence, not
because the plaintiff has produced enough.228 But the defendant's
failure to produce evidence reveals little about the nature or merits
of the plaintiff's claims. Moreover, the existing burden of produc-
tion on summary judgment does not alleviate the difficulties faced
by class action defendants in the settlement process. It does not
reduce litigation expense, as the defendant must still produce evi-
dence to sustain a motion for summary judgment, and hence it
does not offset the advantages gained by plaintiffs in alleging class-
225 See text and notes at notes 204-206 supra.
226 FED. R. Cr;. P. 56.
"' The standard given in rule 56 is whether "there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). See also 6 J. MooRE, supra note 12, 56.04[2], at 56-76; 10 C. WRIGHT & A.
MMLLER, supra note 13, § 2713, at 407.
228 Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745,
751-52 (1974).
[47:688
Title VII Class Actions
wide discrimination.229
This adaptation of summary judgment to the certification pro-
cess would not greatly disrupt the normal use of summary judg-
ment in class actions. The preliminary finding on the merits need
be binding only on the issue of certification. If certification were
denied because the plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing of
merit on his individual claim, the plaintiff could pursue the claim
until the defendant made the showing usually required for sum-
mary judgment. If certification were granted, the defendant need
not be precluded from subsequent motions for summary judgment.
As a practical matter, however, it is doubtful that any such motion
would succeed, at least as to issues on which the plaintiff had made
a sufficient showing on the merits for certification.230
The advantage of adapting an existing device instead of creat-
ing a new one is familiarity. Summary judgment is the standard
means of pretrial adjudication under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Judges and lawyers are acquainted with its operation
and with the standard of proof it requires.
Other proposals to evaluate the merits prior to certification
also have adapted an existing device, although they have chosen
the motion for preliminary injunction. The proposed showing re-
quired has varied from whether "there is a substantial possibility
that [the plaintiffs] will prevail on the merits"231 to whether "there
are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them
fair grounds for litigation. ' 23 2 Such standards emphasize the seri-
ous consequences of certification, which, like issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction, impose substantial burdens upon defendants.
Other factors, however, that have no apparent analogue in the cer-
tification decision, such as the likelihood of irreparable injury to
the plaintiff, also enter into the decision to grant preliminary re-
lief.233 Moreover, these factors have caused the standard for pre-
121 See text and notes at notes 215-216 supra.
2M0 After the plaintiff has made a showing sufficient for certification, the defendant
might move for summary judgment on the basis of newly discovered conflicting evidence,
but because questions of credibility are not resolved on motions for summary judgment, it is
doubtful that the motion would be granted. The defendant nevertheless should be allowed
to make such motions because partial summary judgment might be warranted, particularly
on issues not addressed on the merits in the certification decision. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
131 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
23, H.R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1979); Berry, Ending Substance's In-
denture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage
Action, 80 COLUM. L. R-v. 299, 335 (1980).
SS See 0. Fiss, supra note 76, at 168.
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liminary injunctions to be applied in a narrower range of cases, and
with greater discretion by the district judge, than the standard for
summary judgment. The standard for preliminary injunctions also
poses a greater risk of prejudgment of the merits because it re-
quires a stronger showing that, if made, is more likely to influence
the final decision on the merits. By contrast, denial of summary
judgment for the defendant has never been thought to work to his
prejudice at trial.34 Finally, the standard for summary judgment,
with the burden of production shifted to the plaintiff, is as strict as
necessary. Summary judgment currently is granted to defendants
in Title VII cases with sufficient frequency to indicate that placing
the burden upon plaintiffs would require them to make a signifi-
cant showing on the merits.235
B. Objections to Considering the Merits
Examination of the merits before certification is not a new
idea. Indeed, it usually is regarded as an old idea that has already
been proposed, considered, and rejected. It first gained prominence
in Dolgow v. Anderson,2 s6 in which Judge Weinstein ordered a pre-
certification hearing on the merits of a securities fraud class action.
It was given a mixed reception in the lower federal courts2 7 and
apparently was rejected by the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin.2 3 8 The district court in Eisen imposed 90% of the
cost of notice to the class upon the defendants after a preliminary
showing that the class was "more than likely" to prevail on its
234 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974).
235E.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 87-88, 95-96 (1973) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for plaintiff and finding no violation by defendant); Munoz v. International
Ass'n of Theatrical Stage Employees, 563 F.2d 205, 209-14 (5th Cir. 1977); Thompson v. Sun
Oil Co., 523 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1975); Patmon v. Van Dorn Co., 498 F.2d 544, 547 (6th
Cir. 1974); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1119, 1126 & n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See also 6 J. MooRS, supra note 12, 56.17[10] (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1979).
Some courts have cautioned against summary judgment in employment discrimination
cases because such cases usually involve issues of intent that can only be resolved after a full
hearing on the merits. E.g., EEOC v. Southwest Tex. Methodist Hosp., 606 F.2d 63, 65 (5th
Cir. 1979). To the extent that this caution is well founded, see 6 J. MooRE, supra note 12,
56.16, at 56-661 to -670; 10 C. WRGHT & A. M.LER, supra note 13, § 2730, at 582-600,
2732, at 606-17, it applies to all forms of pretrial adjudication regardless of the standard
employed. It does not favor the preliminary injunction standard over the summary judg-
ment standard.
2-6 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
'" See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MLER, supra note 13, § 1785, at 135-36.
2- 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See 3B J. MooRE, supra note 12, 1 23.45 [4.-4], at 23-376 to
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claims.2 s3 Both the court of appeals24 and the Supreme Court 41
held this ruling to be erroneous, on the ground that rule 23 did not
authorize an inquiry into the merits. The Supreme Court stated
flatly: "We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule
23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary in-
quiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it
may be maintained as a class action. '242 The Court reasoned that a
preliminary hearing on the merits was inconsistent with the re-
quirement of rule 23(c)(1) that the certification decision be made
"[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement" 243 of the ac-
tion.2 4 The Court also feared that the preliminary determination
would be made without procedural safeguards and that a finding
adverse to the defendant would be prejudicial at trial.245
Despite the breadth of its language, the Court's immediate
concern was with the cost of notice imposed on the defendants.246
It expressly refused to reach other issues because it found the no-
tice requirements of rule 23 to be disposiive.247 The Court rea-
soned that the plaintiff should not obtain the benefit, and the de-
fendants should not bear the burden, of certification of a class
action until the plaintiff had shown that the requirements of rule
23 had been satisfied. 24 8 By contrast, preliminary examination of
the merits without shifting the cost of notice would benefit defen-
dants. If the plaintiff failed to make the necessary showing, the
defendant would be relieved of the expense of litigation, the expo-
sure to liability, and the pressure of settlement of a class action. 249
Unlike the procedure attempted in Eisen, a precertification show-
"' Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 479 F.2d
1005 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
" 479 F.2d at 1015-16.
"1 417 U.S. at 177-79.
212 Id. at 177.
24I FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1).
24 417 U.S. at 178.
245 Id. See text at note 234 supra.
246 That cost was more than $19,000. 417 U.S. at 168.
2" Id. at 172 n.10.
248 Id. at 177-79.
M The opportunity for defendants to obtain summary judgment binding on the class
would be restricted, but the effect of this restriction would be minimal. For most defendants
the enhanced preclusive effect of class actions is not worth the increased exposure to liabil-
ity. Few defendants indeed have welcomed class actions because of their greater preclusive
effect. Most have vigorously opposed certification because the statute of limitations offers
similar preclusive effect without increased exposure to liability. Dam, supra note 69, at 120.
As a practical matter, subsequent actions would also be deterred by denial of certification
because of an insufficient showing on the merits of the class claims. Id.
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ing of merit would not require defendants to assist plaintiffs in
maintaining class actions. Instead, it would protect defendants
from unwarranted certification of class actions.
Despite its pervasive influence on class action practice, the de-
cision in Eisen has not prevented district courts from making or
reexamining certification decisions after hearing motions for pre-
liminary injunctions or for summary judgment, or even after trial
on the merits.2 50 This practice has been encouraged by the ten-
dency of the courts of appeals, which usually review certification
rulings only after final judgment on the merits, 51 to rely on the
disposition on the merits in determining the appropriateness of
certification.252 The Supreme Court itself examined the merits in
East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 253 when it
relied on the failure of the named plaintiffs' individual claims to
250 E.g., Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 166 (5th Cir. 1977) (after trial in nonemployment
civil rights action); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1345 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(decertification after trial)j Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 520-24 (6th Cir.)
(after trial), cert. denied, t429 U.S. 870 (1976); Hernandez v. Gray, 530 F.2d 858, 859 (10th
Cir.) (after trial), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d
721, 723 (8th Cir.) (after trial), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Harris v. White, 479 F.
Supp. 996, 1012 (D. Mass. 1979) (motion to dismiss); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 477 F. Supp.
1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (summary judgment); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 801 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (summary judgment in non-Title VII employment discrimination case); Garcia v.
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (summary
judgment); Lightfoot v. Gallo Sales Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 619 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (pre-
liminary injunction); Forst v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 609 (D.D.C. 1972)
(partial summary judgment). See 3B J. MooRE, supra note 12, 1 23.50, at 23-425 to -433; 7A
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1785, at 87-89 (Supp. 1978); Developments, supra
note 5, at 1418-27.
Some decisions have criticized the tendency to reach the merits before ruling on certifi-
cation. E.g., Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 555 F.2d 270, 273-75 (10th Cir. 1977);
Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). See Developments, supra
note 5, at 1419-20.
251 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978); Gardner v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480-81 (1978).
252 United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 848 (4th Cir. 1979); Scott v. Uni-
versity of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 88-89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Camper v.
Calumet Petrochems., Inc., 584 F.2d 70, 71 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Shipp v. Memphis
Area Office, Tenn. Dep't of Empl. Security, 581 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); Walker v. World Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1977);
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972) (non-Title VII employment discrimina-
tion case).
The Supreme Court has also noted that certification rulings are "'enmeshed in the fac-
tual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action.'" Coopers & Lybrand v. Live-
say, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1972) (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555
(1963)).
26 431 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1977).
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justify denial of certification. 5'
The widespread practice of conducting discovery and hearings
on certification also has brought the parties and the district courts
closer to an examination of the merits.255 Decisions are not uncom-
mon in which the district court analyzes evidence of disproportion-
ate adverse impact in ruling upon certification,256 or conversely, in
which it denies certification, and dismisses the named plaintiff's
claim with prejudice for closely related reasons.257 In some re-
spects, consideration whether class members will. ultimately obtain
relief has become so routine that it has escaped recognition. The
most common example is exclusion of class members whose claims
are barred by the*statute of limitations. 258 Another is exclusion of
those whose claims are precluded by related litigation.29 Thus Ei-
sen neither was intended to be, nor has been interpreted as, an
absolute bar to precertification examination of the merits.
' But see text and notes at notes 204-206 supra.
211 Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1312-14 (4th Cir. 1978) (discovery before certi-
fication encouraged); Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1312-13 (9th
Cir. 1977) (dictum) (encouraging discovery in most cases); Walker v. World Tire Corp., 563
F.2d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1977) (discovery and evidentiary hearing); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485
F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (discovery before certification encouraged); Harris v.
White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1009-10 (D. Mass. 1979) (certification hearing postponed for evi-
dentiary hearing); Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 78 F.R.D. 125, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(certification denied after discovery); Solin v. State Univ., 416 F. Supp. 536, 541 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (certification ruling postponed for discovery); Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 423 F.
Supp. 155, 167-68 (D. Utah 1975) (certification ruling postponed for specific pleading and
discovery).
258 Martin v. Arkansas Arts Center, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 555, 559 n.6 (E.D. Ark.
1979); Roberts v. Marine Midland Bank, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,666, 11,668, 11,670
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Rosendaul v. Garret Freight Lines, Inc., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 881, 883-
85 (D. Idaho 1979); Garrett v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 25, 32-40 (M.D.N.C.
1978); Hopewell v. University of Pittsburgh, 79 F.R.D. 689, 693-96 (W.D. Pa. 1978);
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 78 F.R.D. 352, 355-56 (N.D. Tex. 1978), motion to decer-
tify denied, 82 F.R.D. 420, 430-32 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
"I' E.g., King v. Gulf Oil Co., 581 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1978); Golden v. Lascara, 17
Fair. Emp. Prac. Cas. 1129 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
113 E.g., In re Consolidated Pretrail Proceedings in Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1147-
52 (7th Cir. 1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472-76 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 972 (1975); Beasley v. Griffin, 81 F.R.D. 114, 118 (D. Mass.
1979). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 133, at 290-91 (Supp. 1979). Contra, Lam-
phere v. Brown Univ., 71 F.R.D. 641, 648-49 (D.R.I. 1976) (limitations issue goes to the
merits), appeal dismissed, 553 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1977).
"'= Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1977);
Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 466 F. Supp. 662, 672 (E.D. La. 1979); Kuhn v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 80 F.R.D. 681, 685-86 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Bishop v. United States Steel
Corp., 76 F.R.D. 400, 402 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Garnett v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 18
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1773 (D. Colo. 1977).
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The requirement of rule 23(c)(1) that the certification decision
be made "as soon as practicable" 260 also does not preclude exami-
nation of the merits before certification. Subdivision (c)(1) itself
provides that certification rulings "may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits. 26 1 This
practice has become widespread, if not routine, in Title VII litiga-
tion.262 As Judge Weinstein argued in Dolgow v. Anderson,263 con-
ditional rulings that may be reconsidered after examination of the
merits are little different from initial rulings preceded by examina-
tion of the merits. The issue is not whether subdivision (c)(1) pre-
cludes all inquiry into the merits,6 4 but rather what kind of in-
quiry it precludes: in particular, what kind of inquiry is
inconsistent with the reasons for requiring early rulings on
certification.
.Several of the reasons initially offered for the requirement
have lost force. It was feared, for instance, that delayed denial of
certification would prevent independent actions by class members
because their claims would be barred by the statute of limita-
tions.265 The Supreme Court subsequently has held, however, that
the statute of limitations is tolled from the filing of a class action
until denial of certification.266 Far from burdening class members,
delayed rulings on certification lengthen the period during which
they can obtain relief. The fear that delayed certification would
impair the effectiveness of notice to class members26 7 has also
proved to be exaggerated. The length of time over which certified
260 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
is' Id.
262 E.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343, 1346 (4th Cir. 1976)
(en banc). See 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 3, at 1330-31. The conditional nature of certifica-
tion rulings was one reason that led the Supreme Court to hold that such rulings are not
appealable orders. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 & n.11 (1978);
Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480-81 n.6 (1978).
2.3 43 F.R.D. 472, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Accord, 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, 1 23.45 [4.-
4], at 23-384 to -386.
264 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 133, at 287-88 n.94 (Supp. 1979) (eviden-
tiary showing of some kind required); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1759, at
577-79 (approving examination of merits to determine whether rule 23 is satisfied); Note,
The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1143-45 (1974)
(judges tend to examine the merits before certification).
2" Frankel, supra note 59, at 40.
266 American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). See 3B J. MOORE, supra
note 12, 23.90[3], at 23-551 to -557; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 1800, at
171-72 (Supp. 1979).
26' Frankel, supra note 59, at 40-41.
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class actions remain pending26 8 suggests that there is ample time
for effective notice. The problem of settlements before certification
has also been resolved by applying some, if not all, of the safe-
guards of subdivision (e) regardless of the timing of certification.26 9
The principal reason for early certification offered by the Ad-
visory Committee was to prevent the practice of one-way interven-
tion, allowing class members to wait until judgment had been ren-
dered on the merits before deciding whether to intervene, and thus
to take advantage of a favorable judgment without being bound by
an adverse judgment.27 0 But the weakening of mutuality as a pre-
requisite to collateral estoppel permits the equivalent of one-way
intervention: a nonparty may obtain the benefit of a favorable
judgment without being bound by an unfavorable judgment.27 1 Of
course, in some cases one-way intervention is unfair, but the rea-
son for weakening the requirement of mutuality is to allow such
cases to be identified more precisely,272 so that preclusion will be
applied only when it is fair to do so. The requirement of early cer-
tification of class actions should receive a similar interpretation.
Prompt certification should be required only when delay gives rise
to the dangers of one-way intervention.
Certification after a preliminary examination of the merits
does not create such dangers. The defendant is not required to liti-
gate every purported class action fully for fear of classwide liability
if he loses, without any assurance of classwide preclusion if he
wins. A preliminary showing of merit only establishes a necessary
condition for certification; it does not result in a final adjudication.
Even if the plaintiff carries his burden and establishes the exis-
tence of a class, all that he has accomplished is certification of a
"' See DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago
Experience (pt. 1), 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1023, 1056-63; Note, supra note
264, at 1139-45. Although these studies are not concerned with Title VII class actions, there
is no evidence that Title VII class actions, if certified, are more quicky disposed of than
class actions of other kinds. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1704, 1705 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (settlement approved six years after lawsuit
commenced); Coleman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1124, 1125
(E.D. Va. 1978) (settlement approved five years after lawsuit commenced).
2' See 3B J. MOORE, supra note 12, % 23.80[2], at 23-508 to -509; 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 13, § 1797, at 236-37 (1972 & Supp. 1978). Compare Shelton v. Pargo,
Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978) with Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D.
Tex. 1977).
270 See note 73 supra.
211 E.g., Dam, supra note 69, at 124; Developments, supra note 5, at 1395-96.
272 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-32 (1979); Hazard, Res Nova in
Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1040-44 (1971).
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class action. Class members must still await judgment in favor of
the class.
In short, a limited examination of the merits before certifica-
tion poses few of the problems recognized in Eisen. It is also con-
sistent with the language and purposes of subdivision (c)(1) and
with the practice of granting conditional certification, and indeed
of examining the merits, in existing decisions. The only remaining
argument against requiring a showing of merit before certification
is that it has no explicit basis in rule 23. The same could be said,
however, of the presumption in favor of certification of Title VII
class actions. The broad judicial discretion granted by rule 23,73
and the recognized need for judicial decisions to accommodate the
rule to other sources of law, require procedures beyond those men-
tioned in the rule. The failure of more ambitious innovations, such
as shifting the cost of notice to defendants before judgment and
allowing intervention by class members after judgment, should not
preclude any examination of the merits before certification.
C. Two Applications
Two of the leading Title VII class action decisions discussed
earlier provide useful illustrations of the effect of examining the
merits before certification. These cases, Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp.1" and Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,7 5 are
both familiar and influential. If a preliminary inquiry into the mer-
its would have altered their results or reasoning, such an inquiry
would be likely to have a similar effect on many other decisions as
well.
Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp. illustrates the conservative effect
on existing law of a preliminary examination of the merits. Such an
examination would have clarified the court's reasoning without al-
tering its decision. The plaintiff claimed that he had been denied a
promotion because he was black. He also sued on behalf of a class
of all blacks similarly affected by the defendant's discriminatory
employment practices2 76 He filed a charge with the EEOC alleging
both individual and classwide discrimination, and the EEOC found
reasonable cause to support both claims. This determination was
273 See text and notes at notes 65-67 supra.
217 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
.7 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
2'7 Specifically, those practices were segregated job classifications and discriminatory
denial of training opportunities, wage increases and transfers. 251 F. Supp. at 185, 188.
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not binding upon the district court,2 77 but would now be admissible
in evidence. 278 The district court could have found that the plain-
tiff's claims survived a motion for summary judgment for purposes
of certification by relying either on the Commission's finding of
reasonable cause or on the evidence supporting it.2 7 9 Such a pre-
liminary determination by the district court would have supported
findings of commonality and typicality without reliance on the
maxim, "Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimina-
tion."280 The remaining requirements of present rule 23(a) would
have been satisfied by the district court's implicit findings of
numerosity and adequacy of representation. 2 1 The substantial
claim of classwide discrimination and the accompanying request
for injunctive relief would have satisfied the requirements of pre-
sent subdivision (b)(2).282
In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., a preliminary
examination of the merits would have revealed the excesses attrib-
utable to the presumption in favor of certification. The named
plaintiff sought back pay on his own behalf, alleging that he had
been discharged because he had acted as the spokesman for a
group of black employees. He also sought relief on behalf of all
past, present, and future black employees, alleging generalized dis-
crimination.83 One difficulty with certification of this class is that
the named plaintiff did not seek reinstatement and so had no per-
sonal stake in the claims that he asserted on behalf of present and
future employees. 284 Although his individual claim might have
raised issues of classwide discrimination, the postcertification opin-
ions in Johnson reveal that it did not. The gap between the indi-
vidual claim and the class claim is most sharply revealed by the
.fact that the individual claim was settled before trial without any
'77 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
278 FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
' The Commission may not disclose information obtained during conciliation efforts,
but it may disclose information obtained from an investigation after an action has been
commenced. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 706(a), 709(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e)
(1976). Some courts have also allowed earlier disclosure to the charging party. See generally
Comment, Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private Employers, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 477
(1979).
280 251 F. Supp. at 186.
282 The court found that the requirements of former rule 23(a), which included numer-
osity and adequacy of representation, were satisfied. Id. at 188.
282 Id. at 185-86, 188. Contrary to the district court's ruling, id. at 188, certification as
to compensatory relief might have been proper. See note 115 supra.
283 417 F.2d at 1123.
28 See text and notes at notes 130-134 supra.
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apparent effect on the class claims.28 5
Although the district court included claims of discriminatory
discharge within the class claims, it expressly held that these could
"only be determined on an individual basis."2 The district court
resolved an individual claim that had been consolidated with the
class action in this fashion, and it invited class members to file
claims of discriminatory discharge within a specific period.287 Two
such claims were filed, but neither raised any issues of classwide
significance.2 88 The class action, therefore, should not have encom-
passed claims of discriminatory discharge. Because this was the
only claim advanced by the named plaintiff, the class action should
not have been-certified at all.
If a class action could have been properly certified in Johnson
as to some claims, an examination of the merits would have pro-
vided a ready means for dealing with the concerns about over-
broad, conclusory allegations of discrimination expressed by Judge
Godbold in his concurring opinion.2 9 If the named plaintiff had
sought to represent a class composed of employees and applicants
at all of the defendarit's thirty-two truck terminals, he would have
been required to present evidence applicable to each. As tried,
however, the case was confined to the defendant's Atlanta termi-
nal. Judging from the district court's ultimate findings on the mer-
its, the class claims at trial were also limited to issues suited to
class treatment. The claim that restrooms and lunchrooms were
segregated clearly applied to the entire class. The claims of dis-
criminatory hiring and transfers into previously all-white depart-
ments were supported by findings that the defendant had imposed
job qualifications that resulted in the disproportionate disqualifica-
tion of blacks but that had no relationship to job performance, and
that previously all-white departments had few or no black employ-
ees.290 Preliminary evidence on these issues could have been
28 Pretrial procedures had narrowed these class claims to segregation of restrooms,
lunchrooms, and certain departments. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 4 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 553 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
288 Id. at 556.
287 Id. at 556, 557-58. The other individual claimant did seek reinstatement, but there
is no indication that he sought to represent the class. Even if he had, the individualized
nature of his claim would have cast doubt on his ability to do so. See id.
288 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 776 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
289 417 F.2d at 1125-27 (Godbold, J., concurring). See text and notes at notes 128-129
supra.
2" 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 554-56.
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presented before certification. Job qualifications and patterns of
hiring can be proved with relative ease after discovery of the de-
fendant's personnel records, which EEOC regulations require em-
ployers to retain after a charge has been filed with the Commis-
sion.2 91 It would not have burdened the district court greatly to
consider whether the class claims were sufficient to withstand sum-
mary judgment, and it would have greatly clarified the extent of
the class and the claims asserted on its behalf.
Decisions subsequent to Johnson have continued to allow past
employees not seeking reinstatement to represent present and fu-
ture employees, on the ground that former employees are in a bet-
ter position than present employees to protect the interests of the
class.2 9 2 The reason usually offered is that discharged employees
are acquainted with the employer's operations but are no longer
subject to the threat of retaliation.293 Knowledge of the employer's
business is addressed to the effectiveness of the named plaintiff's
advocacy rather than to his interests in common with the class. A
former employee's knowledge does nothing to differentiate him
from a knowledgeable outsider. The risk of intimidation of present
employees provides a stronger reason, particularly since it is fre-
quently invoked in other areas of labor law.29 In Johnson itself,
the named plaintiff's complaint alleged retaliation,29 5 and the dis-
trict court made findings on the merits that black employees had
been deterred from seeking transfers to better positions.296 As with
all substantive arguments for certification on grounds of assisting
victims of discrimination, this argument is better evaluated after
an examination of the merits29 7 to determine the likelihood that
class members were too intimidated to act on their own behalf.
In any event, some individual class members must participate
in the proceedings if a class action is to be maintained at all. They
must assist in pretrial investigation, give testimony during discov-
"' 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1979). Additional record keeping requirements are imposed
on employers by the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.15 (1979). Employers with 100 employees or more also are required to file regular
reports with the EEOC, 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (1979), but disclosure of such reports by the
EEOC is subject to restrictions. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 133, at 825.
"' See note 133 supra.
See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
24 See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-42 (1978).
295 417 F.2d at 1123.
26 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 555.
297 See text at notes 213-214 supra.
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ery and trial, and come forward to take advantage of any individ-
ual relief granted by the district court. Moreover, the degree of in-
timidation probably decreases as the likelihood of judicial relief
and the intensity of judicial examination of the defendant's per-
sonnel decisions increase."'
To the extent that intimidation presents a serious problem, it
can be dealt with by means less drastic than granting a nonmem-
ber of the class the right to sue on its behalf. Present employees
should be allowed to sue anonymously.29 9 Alternatively, if a past
employee has already commenced an action on behalf of present
employees, the court should determine whether he seeks reinstate-
ment, and if not, whether the claim of intimidation is sufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment by the defendant.300 If
it is, the district court should proceed to solicit intervention by
present employees and to protect them explicitly from retaliation.
These mechanisms protect the identity of present employees until
the action has progressed far enough to reduce the threat of retali-
ation. They are less drastic innovations than allowing a nonmem-
ber to represent the class. Although they represent departures
from orthodox judicial procedures, they are more overt than subtle
expansion of the class action. Because they alter traditional prac-
tices more obviously, they also define the limits of the class action
more effectively.
CONCLUSION
Class actions have given rise to many questions, few of which
have been resolved, even in such a specialized area as Title VII
298 Title V11 itself assumes some weakening of intimidation as enforcement proceedings
progress. Charges may be filed with the EEOC "by or on behalf of a person claiming to be
aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission," Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1976), but only the actual victim of discrimination can receive a right-to-sue
letter and file a private suit, id. § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
2" The only decision to consider the issue has held that Title VII plaintiffs may not sue
anonymously, Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe,
599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979), but the court restricted disclosure of the plaintiff's identities to
defense counsel and two named partners in the defendant law firm, id. at 714. See
Brinkerhoff v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 83 F.R.D. 478, 481-82 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (denying discov-
ery of class members' identities before certification).
1o* Although an unorthodox technique in ordinary litigation, solicited intervention is
authorized in class actions, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2), (3), and commonly used, see Cox v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1972) (district court to retain case on
docket for intervention of appropriate class representative); Developments, supra note 5, at
1482-85.
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litigation. In this article, I have proposed a partial answer to some
of these questions. The presumption in favor of certification of Ti-
tle VII class actions should be discarded. In addition to satisfying
the requirements of rule 23, plaintiffs should be required to make a
precertification showing on the merits sufficient to withstand a mo-
tion for summary judgment by the defendant. Such a preliminary
examination of the merits would allow substantive law to give con-
tent to the general requirements of rule 23 and to shape class ac-
tion practice into a more effective device for implementing sub-
stantive policy.301 Unlike the presumption in favor of certification,
a preliminary examination of the merits would have a dynamic in-
fluence on class action procedure. It would allow class action proce-
dures to adapt to changes in substantive law, and more generally,
to evolve with accumulated judicial experience into a more coher-
ent body of procedural rules. Preliminary examination of the mer-
its might also prove fruitful in other areas of substantive law, but
always with the caveat that different statutes and different sub-
stantive policies are likely to require different procedures.
Other proposals for reform of class action law have been
bolder; they have advocated returning to the original version of
rule 23,302 or replacing the rule in whole or in part by statute.303
Arguments have been advanced, on the one hand, that the present
rule exceeds the authority granted to the Supreme Court by the
Rules Enabling Act,s0' and on the other, that the Supreme Court
construed the rule too strictly in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.30 5 I
have adopted a different course, not because I believe that the rule
as currently construed is immune from criticism, but because I ac-
cept the truism that any reform of class action practice must take
account of existing law. Legislative or judicial reform must begin
with experience under the present rule, and arguments that ex-
isting law is in large part invalid or incorrect must begin with the
precedential authority of the many decisions that have pursued the
course set by the Supreme Court. Just as the trend toward increas-
ing class action litigation is not likely to be reversed, so too the
need to reconcile and understand existing law is not likely to
diminish.
301 It would also permit development of specific rules applicable to Title VII class ac-
tions, a subject I intend to develop in a subsequent article.
::2 Dam, supra note 69, at 121-26.
3 See Miller, supra note 8, at 682-93; Developments, supra note 5, at 1623-44.
301 See text and notes at notes 83-87 supra.
305 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See Dam, supra note 69, at 109-16.
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